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ABSTRACT
Since 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court has required that death penalty regimes meet
two requirements. First, in order to minimize arbitrariness in the imposition of the
death penalty, states must reserve capital punishment to a narrow class of offenders,
those most deserving of death. States have done so by requiring that the prosecution
prove at least one aggravating factor, i.e., some circumstance that separates the capital
defendant on trial from those ineligible to be executed. Second, states must allow for
individualization in sentencing by permitting the defendant to introduce mitigating
evidence in order to persuade the jury that he is undeserving of death. The outcome
has been that the penalty phase of the typical capital trial results in a flood of infor-
mation from both prosecution and defense, much of it having little to do with the
crime itself, through which the jury must wade.
Whatever else may be said about our current death penalty jurisprudence, this
flood of aggravating and mitigating evidence implicates the potential for informa-
tion overload on the part of the capital jury. The concept of information overload-
essentially, that too much information presented to a decision maker can result in
sub-optimal decision making-has been widely explored in the marketing area. A
few scholars have written on the potential impact of this phenomenon on consumer
law and securities regulation. But until now, none has written on the potential im-
pact of information overload on the capital jury. The sheer amount of information
presented at the penalty phase of a capital trial likely exceeds many jurors' capacities
to process that information. In addition, the novelty, complexity, ambiguity, and in-
tensity of the decision to be made virtually assure that a significant number of capital
jurors experience information overload. Jurors under such a constraint face two
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choices. First, they may "satisfice," or reach a decision that is sub-optimal simply
to end the decision-making process. Second, they may "opt out," or abdicate their
decision-making responsibilities to the otherjurors. Neither result is acceptable in
the capital context.
In order to ease the potential effects of information overload, death penalty
jurisdictions, with the approval of the Supreme Court, should reduce the amount of
information presented at the penalty phase of capital trials. One logical way of doing
this is to limit aggravating and mitigating circumstances at the penalty-selection stage
to those that reflect on the individual culpability of the offender for the crime of
conviction. This would mean doing away with victim impact evidence, evidence of
future dangerousness, and all other non-culpability related aggravating evidence.
This limitation would also require a loosening of the current strictures the Supreme
Court currently places on the states' ability to limit the defendant's presentation of
mitigating evidence. States should be permitted to limit the defendant's introduction
of mitigating evidence to that which reflects on his culpability for the crime, broadly
conceived, and the states should exercise that authority.
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Anyone who has bought toothpaste in recent years may have experienced
information overload. There was a time when one simply had to choose a brand.
Nowadays, as one wades down the toothpaste aisle, one is faced with various new
medicinal qualities of the once bland dentifrice-tartar controlling, teeth whitening,
breath freshening, baking powder containing-in every possible combination and
permutation. One suspects, and empirical research suggests, that many consumers
leave the toothpaste aisle having made a sub-optimal purchase. But the consumer
will have a chance to correct her mistake, perhaps after consulting with her dentist,
and make a better-informed choice the next time. And even if she does not, the stakes
are, after all, pretty low.
Now imagine deciding whether a fellow human being will live or die. A dif-
ferent kind of information overload may be at work here. Instead of an inordinately
large number of choices, the decision maker is faced with only two-life or death-
but to make the choice, she typically must wade through an inordinately large amount
of information. Again, the result may be sub-optimal, or even arbitrary. But this time,
there is no second chance. And the stakes are as high as they get.
Since 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court has read the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution as demanding that arbitrariness be minimized when the state seeks to
impose the penalty of death.' Much has been written on the arguable failure of that
endeavor. Without passing judgment on other objections to our modem system of
capital punishment, this Article suggests an additional potential defect of that system
' Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189
(1976) (indicating "that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize
the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305-06
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that the death penalty is different in nature than any
other punishment in our criminal justice system and that because of the finality of a death
sentence, there exists an extraordinary need for reliability in the conclusion that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case).
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that has allowed arbitrariness to seep back into the system: the problem of informa-
tion overload. Specifically, this Article argues that because the typical capital jury
must process virtually an unlimited amount of evidence relating to aggravating and
mitigating factors, current death penalty jurisprudence might, paradoxically, enhance,
rather than reduce, arbitrariness. This might occur because overwhelmed capital jurors
experience information overload, and consequently disengage from the decision-
making process and choose a result simply to end deliberations.
Part I of this Article reviews the Supreme Court's capital punishment jurispru-
dence and its attempt both to limit arbitrariness and enhance individualized capital
sentencing. This Part also discusses the role of aggravating and mitigating factors
in furthering those goals. Part II discusses information overload, a concept studied
extensively in the marketing arena, but whose application to litigation has gone vir-
tually undeveloped. Part 11 examines how aggravating and mitigating evidence argu-
ably cause the capital jury to suffer from information overload and ultimately choose
a capricious result. Finally, Part IV discusses various changes in the law, at both a
constitutional and sub-constitutional level, which, if implemented, could lessen the
degree of arbitrariness in capital cases by reducing the possibility that the capital jury
will experience information overload. Specifically, we argue, it may well be bad
policy to allow limitless aggravating evidence in the penalty-selection phase, and
states should therefore eliminate evidence of future dangerousness, victim impact
evidence, and other non-culpability related aggravating factors. In addition, because
mitigating factors also contribute significantly to the information overload potentially
experienced by the capital juror, we argue that the Supreme Court should re-think
its current jurisprudence, which permits the capital defendant to introduce almost un-
limited amounts of mitigating evidence. To reduce the amount of mitigating evidence
that the defendant presents to the capital jury, the Supreme Court should allow states
to limit mitigating evidence to that which relates to the defendant's culpability for the
crime itself, broadly defined.
I. OUR MODERN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REGIME: MINIMIZiNG ARBITRARINESS
WHILE ENHANCING INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING
The Supreme Court has required, as a matter of federal constitutional law, that
capital punishment regimes embody two distinct precepts. First, they must mini-
mize arbitrariness in the imposition of capital punishment.2 Second, they must
provide for individualized sentencing of the capital defendant.3 At the heart of this
system in the overwhelming majority of death penalty states is the capital jury and
its consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Court's goal has
been "to develop a reasoned, consistent, and nonarbitrary system of inflicting the
punishment of death."4
2 See, e.g., Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
3 See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
4 Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today's
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A. Minimizing Arbitrariness in Death Penalty Cases Through the Use of
Aggravating Circumstances
In 1972, the Supreme Court initiated a temporary moratorium with the "corner-
stone decision"5 in death penalty jurisprudence, Furman v. Georgia.6 Furman indi-
cated that, although capital punishment is an acceptable method for punishing violent
criminals who commit murder,7 because Georgia's capital sentencing regime provided
thejury with "unrestrained discretion to decide whether to impose the death penalty,"8
it resulted in cruel and unusual punishment, thus violating the Eighth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. 9 As a result, the Supreme Court "effectively rendered then-
existing death penalty laws functionally invalid," thus imposing a temporary capital
punishment moratorium.o
Because, however, Furman did not eliminate the death penalty per se," following
Furman, thirty-eight states altered their capital punishment statutes in an attempt to
satisfy Furman's ambition to avoid arbitrary and capricious application of the death
penalty. 2 Subsequently, in the case of Gregg v. Georgia,'3 the Supreme Court
Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. &MARY BILLRTS. J. 345,346
(1998).
' James H.S. Levine, Creole and Unusual Punishment-A Tenth Anniversary Examination
of Louisiana's Capital Rape Statute, 51 ViL. L. REv. 417,427-28 (2006).
6 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see also Kirchmeier, supra note 4, at 352 ("In effect, the Court's
decision prevented the execution of all of the prisoners on death rows in the United States
at the time." (citing FRANKLiN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND
THE AMERICAN AGENDA 37 (1989))).
' Furman, 408 U.S. at 306-07 (Stewart, J., concurring) (indicating that capital punishment
is appropriate in limited cases); see also Carrie L. Flores, Comment, The "Tie" Goes to the
State in Kansas v. Marsh: A Small Victory for Proponents of the Death Penalty, 42 VAL. U.
L. REv. 675, 675 (2008).
' Flores, supra note 7, at 679 n.23 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. 238).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
'0 Rachel Ruttenberg, Note, Equation of Death: Mitigating Factors Plus Aggravating
Factors Equals Equipoise!, 28 WHrrrIER L. REv. 1351, 1361 (2007).
" Kirchmeier, supra note 4, at 352.
12 Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the
Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REv. 121,147-48 (1988); see also Rob Warden, Illinois
Death Penalty Reform: How it Happened, What it Promises, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
381, 386 (2005) (indicating that, in response to Furman, thirty-eight state legislatures passed
new capital sentencing laws with revised procedures that more appropriately address the prob-
lems discussed in Furman); Ruttenberg, supra note 10 ("[S]tate legislatures were sent into
a 'drafting frenzy' and 'over three-quarters of the states and the federal government have
reenacted statutes allowing for capital sentencing for certain crimes,' to bring their statutes
in compliance with the demands of the Court." (citations omitted)).
'3 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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determined that Furman did not require legislatures to fully eliminate thejury' s dis-
cretion, but instead required that such discretion be "directed and limited."' 4 In other
words, capital punishment schemes must provide the jury with guided, in contrast to
unbridled, discretion during the trial's penalty phase. 5
In particular, the Supreme Court placed its seal of approval upon several spe-
cific features that were present in states' updated death penalty regimes. 6 First, the
Supreme Court noted that, because the trial is bifurcated into a guilt phase and penalty
phase, 7 the jury has the ability, in the penalty phase, to focus solely upon the issue of
death and its implications. 8 Second, the Court noted the safeguard provided by auto-
matic proportionality review by the highest state court in many death penalty schemes. 9
Third, the Supreme Court noted that the updated capital punishment schemes permit-
ted the capital jury to apply morals and mercy to the defendant by considering relevant
mitigating circumstances.2' Perhaps most significantly, however, the updated death
penalty schemes channeled the jury's discretion by requiring the jury to find beyond
a reasonable doubt at least one statutory aggravating factor beyond the mere fact of
a murder in order to impose the death penalty.2'
Aggravating factors serve two purposes. First, the presence of an aggravating
factor renders the defendant eligible to be sentenced to death. Second, aggravating
factors are then compared by the jury to any mitigating factors in selecting the de-
fendant's sentence. Recent years have seen an increased amount of aggravating evi-
dence at both the eligibility and selection stages.
14 Id. at 189.
'" Id. at 193 ("It is quite simply a hallmark of our legal system that juries be carefully and
adequately guided in their deliberations.").
16 Id. at 189-207.
17 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1543 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a "bifurcated trial" as
"[a] trial that is divided into two stages, such as for guilt and punishment or for liability and
damages").
"s Gregg, 428 U.S. at 191-92 ("When a human life is at stake and when the jury must have
information prejudicial to the question of guilt but relevant to the question of penalty in order
to impose a rational sentence, a bifurcated system is more likely to ensure elimination of the
constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman."); see also Jeffrey Abramson, Death-is-
Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 126
(2004) ("In a bifurcated trial, the sentencer was also able to put aside the question of guilt
and focus freshly on evidence relevant to the appropriateness of death as punishment.").
'9 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198.
20 Id. at 197 (upholding the portion of Georgia's death penalty statute that noted that "[t]he
jury is not required to find any mitigating circumstance in order to make a recommendation
of mercy that is binding on the trial court").
2 Id. at 206 (noting that the jury "must find and identify at least one statutory aggravating
factor before it may impose a penalty of death" and that "[iln this way the jury's discretion
is channeled").
1094
INFORMATION OVERLOAD AND THE CAPITAL JURY
1. Aggravating Factors as Eligibility Factors
An aggravating factor increases the enormity of the crime, thus singling it out
for special, harsher treatment.22 In order to pass constitutional muster, "[a] capital
sentencing scheme must... provide a 'meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not. '"'23 That is to say, the scheme "must channel the sentencer's discretion by 'clear
and objective standards' that provide 'specific and detailed guidance,' and that 'make
rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death." 24 Thus, before
imposing a death sentence, the capital jury must first find the existence of at least one
statutory aggravating factor.25 This initial step, which is often called the "eligibility
phase, 26 essentially determines whether the defendant is "death-eligible."'27 In other
words, aggravating factors narrow the class of death-eligible defendants, so as to pre-
vent the death penalty from applying to every first-degree murder defendant,28 thus
determining which sub-classes of such defendants are eligible for the death pen-
alty.29 When used for this purpose, aggravating factors are sometimes referred to
as "eligibility factors."30
"This narrowing requirement is usually met when the trier of fact finds at least
one statutorily defined eligibility factor at either the guilt or penalty phase.' The
narrowing function is satisfied at the guilt phase when the very definition of capital
murder, as defined by the legislature, includes an aggravating factor.32 The narrowing
22 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
23 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1980) (alteration in original) (quoting
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 236, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
24 Id. at 428 (citations omitted).
25 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206 (declaring that the jury "must find and identify at least one
statutory aggravating factor before it may impose a penalty of death").
26 Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967,971 (1994) (distinguishing between the "eligibility"
phase of the capital sentencing process and the "selection" phase).
27 Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors
Think?, 98 CoLuM. L. REV. 1538, 1544 (1998).
2' Id. at 1545.
29 Russell Stetler, Mitigation Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb.
1999, http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/698c98dd101a846085256eb400500c01/bee3ff44508
80bb485256704006793eb?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,stetler.
30 See, e.g., Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 217-18 (2006).
"' Id. at 216; see also Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net: Another Decade of
Legislative Expansion of the Death Penalty in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 1,7 (2006)
("Depending on a state's statutory scheme, these eligibility factors may apply at sentencing
as 'aggravating factors' or at the guilt phase as part of the definition of capital murder.").
32 See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988) ("Here, the 'narrowing
function' was performed by the jury at the guilt phase when it found defendant guilty of three
counts of murder under the provision that 'the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict
great bodily harm upon more than one person."'); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,270-71 (1976)
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function is satisfied at the sentencing phase when, after the capital jury has found
the defendant guilty of murder, the jury subsequently determines that the prosecution
has proven at least one statutory aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.33 If
the prosecutor is unable to convince the capital jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the
existence of at least one aggravating factor, then the defendant automatically becomes
ineligible to receive the death penalty.' Because this is the prosecutor's first hurdle
in obtaining a death penalty decision, the prosecutor has an incentive to establish mul-
tiple aggravating factors, thus increasing the amount of evidence being contemplated
and analyzed by the capital jury.
2. Aggravating Factors as Selection Factors
Aggravating factors also serve a second purpose. Once the capital jury finds,
either at the guilt phase or at the sentencing phase, that at least one aggravating factor
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant is therefore death eli-
gible, the jury then considers the aggravating factor or factors, along with any mitigat-
ing factors, to determine whether the defendant will actually be sentenced to death.3"
This is known as the "selection phase.
36
Jurisdictions differ in two main respects regarding how thejury approaches aggra-
vating factors at the selection stage. First, states differ in terms of whether and to
what extent the jury is instructed to weigh or balance the aggravating and mitigating
evidence.37 Second, while some states permit the jury to consider aggravating factors
not enumerated by statute, others do not.38
a. Weighing vs. Non-Weighing States
Some states, sometimes known as "weighing" states, employ a structured, cate-
gorical approach to aggravating and mitigating circumstances.39 In these states, after
the capital jury finds the existence of one or more statutory aggravating circumstances,4
the capital jury weighs the aggravating factors against any available mitigating evidence
("While Texas has not adopted a list of statutory aggravating circumstances the existence of
which can justify the imposition of the death penalty as have Georgia and Florida, its action
in narrowing the categories of murders for which a death sentence may ever be imposed serves
much the same purpose." (citations omitted)).
" Kirchmeier, supra note 31, at 7-8 (noting that the narrowing function can occur at the
sentencing portion of the trial via aggravating circumstances).
3 Id. at 7.
" See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-72 (1977).
36 Id. at 972.
31 See infra Part I.A.2.a.
38 See infra Part I.A.2.b.
39 See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890 (1983).
o Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 229 (1992).
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to ultimately reach a punishment decision. 41 The process "is meant to be a careful,
thoughtful evaluation and assessment of all of the evidence presented., 42 The jury
might be instructed that it may,43 or even must,44 return a verdict of death if aggravators
outweigh mitigators.
In contrast, states that have been called "non-weighing" states do not utilize the
same type of categorical structure.45 Although the jury is still required to declare the
defendant death eligible by finding the existence of at least one statutory aggravating
factor, it is not specifically directed on how to choose between a life and death verdict.'
Rather, "the decision is more open-ended, and the sentencer has complete discretion
to decide between life and death."47
b. Statutory and Non-Statutory Aggravating Factors
The other primary difference among jurisdictions concerns whether the jury may
consider non-statutory aggravating factors. In some states, the jury may consider at
the selection stage only those aggravating factors enumerated by statute.48 In most
states,49 however, the capital jury is permitted to consider in aggravation "facts other
than or in addition to" the proven statutory aggravating factor(s) when determining
whether to impose the death penalty.50 The Supreme Court has approved the use of
non-statutory aggravating factors.51 One scholar observed that the Court has, in effect,
granted to the prosecutor in pursuing a capital sentence the same right it has granted
to the defense in defending against it: "[T]he penalty trial is to be a free market in
"' Id.; see also Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212,216-17 (2006); William J. Bowers, The
Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043,
1063(1995) ("'[Blalancing' statutes ... list both aggravating and mitigating factors and ask
jurors to weigh one against the other when making their punishment decision.").
42 LINDA E. CARTER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW § 11.01 (2d ed.
2008).
43 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4) (West 2009) (indicating that defendant may
be sentenced to life even if aggravators outweigh mitigators).
' See, e.g., Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990) (rejecting petitioner's argu-
ment that the "jury must have freedom to decline to impose the death penalty" under those
circumstances).
41 See Brown, 546 U.S. at 217; Stringer, 503 U.S. at 229-30.
46 Stringer, 503 U.S. at 229-30.
47 CARTER ET AL., supra note 42.
48 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West 2006) ("Aggravating circumstances shall
be limited to the following ... ").
49 See CARTER ET AL., supra note 42, § 11.04 ("Most jurisdictions allow the introduction
and consideration of non-statutory aggravating evidence.").
50 Darian B. Taylor, Capital Sentencing in Arizona: A "Weighing State" In Name Only,
71 ARIZ. AmTY. 20,20-21 (2006), available at http://www.myazbar.org/AZAttomey/index
.cfm?issue=7 1.
"' See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (plurality opinion).
2009] 1097
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1089
information."52 In essence, the Supreme Court will allow the prosecution to introduce
any information that may potentially result in an aggravating factor, "without the
constraint of legal categories. 53 Accordingly, in most jurisdictions the number of
aggravating factors, and therefore the amount of aggravating evidence, that the
prosecutor can present to the jury at the selection stage is virtually limitless.
3. Two Common Types of Aggravating Evidence
Cataloguing all the different types of aggravating evidence, statutory and non-
statutory, would be a monumental task. However, two types are of special note. Evi-
dence of future dangerousness has dominated the death penalty decision and opened
the door to virtually all evidence of a defendant's bad character. Victim impact evi-
dence is a common type of aggravating evidence that, unlike most aggravating and
mitigating evidence, focuses not on the crime or the offender, but on the victim.
a. Evidence of Future Dangerousness
Evidence of future dangerousness has come to dominate the selection stage.
Three states-Texas, Virginia, and Oregon-"expressly predicate death sentences
on the future dangerousness of the defendant. '54 Research has shown that in these
states, "the fate of capital defendants 'is determined almost entirely by juries' delib-
erations on, and emotional responses to,' the future dangerousness inquiry."55 These
three states account for about forty-seven percent of all executions in the United
States since 1976.56 Of the other death penalty jurisdictions, about half expressly
include future dangerousness as a statutory aggravating factor.5 Most of the rest
allow the jury to consider future dangerousness, either pursuant to more broadly
worded statutory provisions 8 or as a non-statutory aggravating factor.59
52 Bowers, supra note 41, at 1066.
53 Id.
' Russell D. Covey, Exorcizing Wechsler's Ghost: The Influence of the Model Penal
Code on Death Penalty Sentencing Jurisprudence, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189,216 (2004).
" Id. at 217 (quoting Jonathan R. Sorensen & Rocky L. Pilgrim, An Actuarial RiskAssess-
ment of Violence Posed by Capital Murder Defendants, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1251,
1252 nn.8-9 (2000)).
56 See Death Penalty Information Center, Executions in the United States, 1608-1976, By
State, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did= 1110 (last visited Apr. 20,
2009) (indicating 435 executions in Texas since 1976, 103 in Virginia, and two in Oregon);
Death Penalty Information Center, Executions by Year, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?scid=8&did= 146 (last visited Apr. 20, 2009) (indicating 1156 executions in the
U.S. since 1976).
" See Covey, supra note 54, at 216.
58 See, e.g., State v. Arguelles, 63 P.3d 731,758-59 (Utah 2003) (allowing consideration
of "probability of future violence by [the] defendant" pursuant to statutory factor referring to
"any other facts in aggravation... of the penalty" (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(a)(iv)
(West 2009))).
'9 See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741,788 (8th Cir. 2001) (considering future
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The Supreme Court has concluded that an inference of future dangerousness may
come from virtually anything the capital defendant has said or done. Thus, prose-
cutors have asked juries to find that the defendant poses a future danger based on his
"criminal record, juvenile criminal record, past aggressive conduct, unproved prior
bad acts, requests for psychiatric treatment, bad reputation, prison behavior, prison
escapes, probation violations, alleged propensity to commit murder, lack of remorse,
and general moral character,'6 ° and even based on such innocuous acts as "'kick[ing]
the bars of his [prison] cell following his arrest.' 6' As a result, "the state's ability to
present character evidence collateral to the circumstances of the crime for which the
defendant is being sentenced is virtually unlimited. 6 2 Moreover, in at least somejuris-
dictions, future dangerousness can be proved by expert testimony.63 Not surprisingly,
research has shown that discussion of a defendant's future dangerousness is "second
only to the crime itself' in terms of the attention given during deliberations at the
penalty phase.64
b. Victim Impact Evidence
Another especially common, and controversial, form of aggravating evidence
is victim impact evidence.65 "Victim impact evidence is a form of evidence that de-
scribes the effect of the crime on the victim and, more specifically, on the victim's
family. '66 The Supreme Court initially held in Booth v. Maryland that the use of
victim impact evidence violated the Eighth Amendment, on the ground that such
dangerousness as a non-statutory aggravating factor).
60 Covey, supra note 54, at 218 (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).
61 Id. at 219 (quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1986) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
62 Id. at 219.
63 See id. at 220-21 (explaining the effectiveness of expert testimony as to future danger-
ousness as a "prosecutorial tool").
6' John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always "At Issue," 86
CORNELL L. REV. 397,404 (2001).
65 RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFo. CTR., BLIND JUSTICE: JURIES DECIDING LIFE
AND DEATH WITH ONLY HALF THE TRUTH 20-21 (Oct. 2005), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo
.org/BlindJusticeReport.pdf ("In almost every state, as the jurors are beginning to grapple
with the difficult life-and-death question before them, the prosecution presents a series of
witnesses who are relatives of the deceased victim.").
66 Jason Elliot Nard, Comment, Pennsylvania's Capital Statute: Does the Introduction
of Victim Impact Evidence-Into the Evaluation of Mitigating and Aggravating Circum-
stances-At the Sentencing Hearing of a Murder Trial Introduce Unjust Prejudice into the
Imposition of the Death Penalty?, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 825, 827 (2004); see also Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 499 (1987) ("Although the [victim impact evidence] is compiled
by the [Division of Parole and Probation], the information is supplied by the victim or the
victim's family. The [victim impact evidence] may be read to the jury during the sentencing
phase, or the family members may be called to testify as to the information." (citation omitted)).
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evidence served "no other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from decid-
ing the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant."'67 The
Supreme Court subsequently performed a one-hundred-and-eighty-degree turn, re-
versing its previous decision in Booth, holding in Payne v. Tennessee that the use
of victim impact evidence does not violate the Constitution.68 As with evidence of
future dangerousness, most death penalty jurisdictions specifically authorize by statute
the introduction of victim impact evidence at the selection stage.69 Others allow such
evidence under more broadly worded statutory provisions.7°
The victim witnesses typically include the victim's relatives, who express the
loss suffered by the victim's family and friends as a result of the victim's death.7'
However, in the vast majority of jurisdictions that allow victim impact evidence,
prosecutors are permitted to introduce testimony from those beyond the confines of
the victim's family.72 Moreover, regardless of who testifies, courts have allowed
juries to consider evidence regarding the impact of the killing on those far beyond
the victim's family and close friends. For example, in one case, the victim's neighbor
testified about the impact of the killing on listeners of a local radio call-in show, 73 and
in another, the sentencer heard evidence concerning the loss to the local community
resulting from the victim's death.74 Courts have also allowed victim impact evidence
to take the form of "videotape presentations depicting a victim's life prior to the
murder, often narrated by a member of the family. 75
4. The Growth in Aggravating Factors: The California Example
Because the Supreme Court permits each individual state to develop and imple-
ment its own capital sentencing scheme, aggravating factors vary significantly from
67 Booth, 482 U.S. at 508-09.
68 501 U.S. 808, 825-27 (1991).
69 CARTERET AL., supra note 42, § 11.03.
70 See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436, 467 (Cal. 1991) (holding victim impact
evidence admissible pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(a), which allows jury consideration
in the selection stage of "[t]he circumstances of the crime").
71 DIETER, supra note 65, at 20.
72 See CARTER ET AL., supra note 42, § 11.03 ("[T]he tendency of the courts has been to
expand the universe of witnesses who may testify.").
71 McClain v. State, 477 S.E.2d 814, 824 (Ga. 1996).
' Moore v. State, 701 So. 2d 545, 551 (Fla. 1997).
75 CARTER ET AL., supra note 42, § 11.03 (citing Hicks v. State, 940 S.W.2d 855, 857
(Ark. 1997); Whittlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223, 251 (Md. 1995)). Recently, a defendant in
one such case fell one vote short of obtaining review by the U.S. Supreme Court of the question
whether such a videotaped presentation goes beyond what is permissible pursuant to Payne
v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825-27 (1991). See Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 564 (2008)
(Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari); Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 567 (2008)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The full twenty-minute video shown to the
jury in the case can be downloaded from http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/video/
kelly_v_california.html.
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state to state. 76 States differ, for example, in the number of statutory aggravating
factors contained in their capital punishment statutes. The aggravating factors that
legislatures deem applicable range from facts surrounding the murder itself,77 to the
motivation for the murder,7 8 to the status of the defendant or the victim.7 9 Some
states' statutory aggravating factor schemes include fewer than ten statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances, ° while, in contrast, other states have more than twenty statutory
aggravating factors.8 ' In recent years, many states have continued to expand the cov-
erage of their capital punishment statutes with additional aggravating factors.
8 2
California, for example, has implemented one of the most expansive statu-
tory aggravating factor schemes currently in existence. 3 It includes twenty-four'
statutory aggravating circumstances, labeled "special circumstances," which the
capital jury may consider when making its punishment decision. 5 Nine of these
76 Ruttenberg, supra note 10, at 1360 ("States exhibit differing views on the death penalty
and the means by which they impose such a sentence on a capital defendant."). See Kirchmeier,
supra note 4, and Kirchmeier, supra note 31, for a comprehensive review of statutory aggra-
vating factors among all states permitting capital punishment.
" See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13 A-5-49(8) (2008) ("The capital offense was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel compared to other capital offenses."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-
18-303(1)(a)(iv) (2007) ("[B]y an offender lying in wait or ambush."); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-202(l)(p) (West 2007) ("[Tlhe homicide was committed by means of the administration
of a poison or of any lethal substance or of any substance administered in a lethal amount,
dosage, or quantity.").
78 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604(6) (West 2007) ('The capital murder was committed for
pecuniary gain."); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2000(e)(4) (West 2007) ("The capital felony
was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape
from custody.").
'9 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9)(i) (2008) ('The defendant, by his conduct, whether
such conduct was before, during or after the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited
a propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society.");
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(A)(1 1) (2008) ("The offender was engaged in the
distribution, exchange, sale, or purchase, or any attempt thereof, of a controlled dangerous
substance ....").
8o See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a) (West 2006) (listing eight statutory
aggravating factors); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(i) (West 2008) (same).
s See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1) (2008) (listing twenty-two statutory
aggravating factors); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b) (West 2008) (listing twenty-one
statutory aggravating factors).
82 Kirchmeier, supra note 31, at 12-14, 25 (noting that "more than twenty different state
legislatures expanded their death penalties by adding factors that make one eligible for the
death penalty" from 1996 to 2006).
83 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 2008).
' Id. Although the statute lists only twenty-two aggravating circumstances, two of these,
relating to the killing of peace officers and federal agents, each encompass two separate
circumstances, depending upon whether the victim was killed because of his status or, rather,
the defendant merely knew or should have known of the status. See infra notes 88-91.
85 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a); see also Shiva Shirazi Davoudian, California Homicide
Law: The Basics, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1375, 1391 (2003).
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special circumstances relate solely to the facts of the killing itself, such as how it
was carried out or how many people were killed by the defendant. 86 Another ten
relate to the motivation behind the killing, either by itself8 7 or in conjunction with
the status of the victim.8 8 Three relate solely to the status of the victim,89 while one
relates solely to the status of the defendant" and another relates to his status in con-
junction with a motivation for the killing.91 Moreover, in selecting the appropriate
sentence, capital juries in California are further directed to consider such non-crime-
related factors as whether the defendant has previously been convicted of a felony92
and whether he previously has used or threatened the use of force or violence in con-
nection with previous criminal activity.93 Finally, California allows the capital jury
to consider non-statutory aggravating factors, beyond the proven statutory aggravating
86 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(3) (a defendant "convicted of more than one offense of
murder in the first or second degree" in a single proceeding); id. § 190.2(a)(4), (6) ("murder...
committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or explosive," either concealed or intended
for delivery via mail); id. § 190.2(a)(14) ("murder ... especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel"); id. § 190.2(a)(15) ("The defendant intentionally killed the victim by means of lying
in wait."); id. § 190.2(a)(17) (murder, whether intentional or not, committed during commission
or attempted commission of an enumerated felony, or during immediate flight therefrom); id.
§ 190.2(a)(18) ("The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture."); id.
§ 190.2(a)(19) ('The defendant intentionally killed the victim by the administration of poison.");
id. § 190.2(a)(21) (stating that intentional murder "perpetrated by means of discharging a
firearm from a motor vehicle").
87 Id. § 190.2(a)(1) (intentional murder "carried out for financial gain"); id. § 190.2(a)(5)
("The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, or
perfecting or attempting to perfect, an escape from lawful custody."); id. § 190.2(a)(16) ('The
victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, color, religion, nationality, or country
of origin."). We include this last category as a "motive" special circumstance rather than as
"victim status" special circumstance for the simple reason that every victim will have a "race,
color, religion [or lack thereof], nationality, or country of origin," and the special circumstance
applies only when the victim is killed because of that status.
88 Id. § 190.2(a)(7)-(8) (victim was either a "peace officer," "former peace officer," or
"federal law enforcement officer or agent" who was "intentionally killed in retaliation for the
performance of his or her official duties"); id. § 190.2(a)(10) (witness elimination or retaliation);
id. § 190.2(a)( 11)-(13), (20) (prosecutor, judge, or other elected or appointed federal or state
official, or juror, killed "in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's
official duties").
89 Id. § 190.2(a)(7)-(9) (victim was either "peace officer," "federal law enforcement
officer or agent," or "firefighter" killed intentionally while engaged in official duties, and
defendant was at least negligent as to victim's status).
9 Id. § 190.2(a)(2) ('The defendant was convicted previously of murder in the first or
second degree.").
"1 Id. § 190.2(a)(22) ("The defendant intentionally killed the victim while the defendant
was an active participant in a criminal street gang.., and the murder was carried out to further
the activities of the criminal street gang.").
' Id. § 190.3(c).
9 Id. § 190.3(b).
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factor(s), in its weighing decision.' These include future dangerousness 95 and victim
impact evidence.96
The current plethora of aggravating factors in some jurisdictions provide prose-
cutors with additional ammunition, thus increasing the probability that the prosecutor
will present multiple aggravating factors to the capital jury to ensure that the capital
jury finds at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.97 In turn, unless
there is a substantial overlap in the relevant aggravating factors, the amount of evi-
dence prosecutors can introduce increases concomitantly. In other words, providing
even more aggravating factors from which the prosecutor can choose results in the
prosecutor presenting more aggravating evidence to the capital jury. Thus, the capital
jury is bombarded with even more information to process and analyze.
B. Enhancing Individuation in Death Penalty Cases Through the Use of
Mitigating Factors
The second element to the capital jury's death penalty decision involves consid-
eration of mitigating circumstances. Mitigating circumstances are factors that the
defendant "proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. 98 In contrast to aggra-
vating factors, which are utilized in both the eligibility and the selection phases, miti-
gating factors are utilized exclusively in the latter.99 Death penalty statutes typically
enumerate potentially applicable mitigating factors."' Many of these schemes borrow
the Model Penal Code's eight mitigating factors that the judge must allow the jury to
consider, so long as each factor is supported by the evidence.l°' Two of these relate
9 Taylor, supra note 50, at 20, 22 n.5.
9' See People v. Michaels, 49 P.3d 1032, 1065-66 (Cal. 2002) (allowing prosecutorial
statements on future dangerousness when supported by evidence admitted pursuant to CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.3).
96 See People v. Zamudio, 181 P.3d 105,134-35 (Cal. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 564
(2008). Technically, introduction of victim impact evidence in California is authorized pur-
suant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(a), which allows jury consideration in the selection stage
of'"[t]he circumstances of the crime." Reading this provision as an open-ended invitation to
consider the characteristics of the victim, however, is akin to allowing non-statutory aggravating
evidence.
" Kirchmeier, supra note 31, at 4.
98 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); see also McKoy v.
NorthCarolina, 494 U.S. 433,441 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367,374-75 (1988);
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987).
99 Stetler, supra note 29. Aggravating factors are used both in the eligibility phase and
in the selection phase because aggravating factors must be considered along with the miti-
gating factors in determining the ultimate punishment. See id.
100 Elizabeth Burleson, Juvenile Execution, Terrorist Extradition, and Supreme Court
Discretion to ConsiderlnternationalDeath Penalty Jurisprudence, 68 ALB. L. REV. 909,941
(2005).
101 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4) (1980).
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to the status of the defendant: his lack of a "significant history of prior criminal
activity" and his youth." The other six relate to the facts and circumstances of the
crime: that "[t]he victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or
consented to the homicidal act," that the defendant's "participation in the homicidal
act was relatively minor," and that the defendant was acting "under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance," a belief in the "moral justification or
extenuation for his conduct," duress, or a mental impairment. °3
However, as a matter of constitutional law, potentially applicable mitigating fac-
tors extend far beyond these few. The Supreme Court has declared that the Eighth
Amendment mandates that states permit the jury to hear and consider virtually all
mitigating evidence."° It is irrelevant if the presented mitigating evidence is wholly
divorced from the criminal act; in order for the jury to accomplish an individualized
determination, the defendant is permitted to showcase all relevant mitigating evidence. °5
The Supreme Court laid the foundation for capital punishment's individualized
sentencing requirement in Furman'°6 and Gregg. 7 However, the Supreme Court
began to focus its attention upon mitigating evidence in Gregg's companion case,
Woodson v. North Carolina. 8 The Court there declared unconstitutional a statute
that made the death penalty mandatory upon commission of a capital offense, without
consideration of any individual characteristics of the defendant."° The Court wrote:
While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing de-
terminations generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather
than a constitutional imperative, we believe that in capital cases
the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment requires consideration of the character and record
of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular
offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of
inflicting the penalty of death."0
102 Id. § 210.6(4)(a), (h).
103 Id. § 210.6(4)(b)-(g).
o Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 651-52 (1990).
105 Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276 (1998).
"o6 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,239-40 (1972). In a separate opinion, Justice White
concluded that the death penalty, without legislative guidelines, violated the Eighth Amendment
because it afforded "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it [was]
imposed from the many cases in which it [was] not." Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
o Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (finding Georgia's capital punishment
statute did not violate the Constitution because, among other things, the statute permitted the
capital jury to consider mitigating evidence, thus channeling the jury's discretion).
108 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
' Id. at 304.
"o Id. (citations omitted).
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The Supreme Court fully circled the wagons around the constitutional basis of
mitigating evidence in Lockett v. Ohio. " In particular, the Supreme Court reasoned
that, given the death penalty's finality and irreversibility, individualized analysis and
consideration is crucial." 2 The Supreme Court ultimately held, as a constitutional
mandate, that the sentencer must be allowed to consider all facets of the defendant's
circumstances and case as mitigating evidence, and capital sentencing schemes that
"prevent[ ] the sentencer... from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects
of the defendant's character... proffered in mitigation" are unconstitutional per se." 13
In essence, the Lockett decision declared that the capital jury's task of analyzing and
considering mitigating evidence involves "a unique moral decision different in kind
from the factfinding of the guilt determination,""' 4 involving the "highly-charged
moral and emotional issue of whether the defendant, notwithstanding his crimes, is
a person who should continue to live.""'
In addition, mitigating evidence is not limited to factors concerning the defendant's
character or circumstances prior to the crime.1 6 Evidence, such as "good behavior"
while in jail awaiting trial or post-crime redemption must be considered by the capital
jury, even though it does not directly relate to the defendant's culpability for the com-
mitted crime because it is clear that such evidence "would be 'mitigating' in the sense
that [it] might serve 'as a basis for a sentence less than death.""'" Moreover, the
Supreme Court essentially demands that defense counsel, after conducting the neces-
sary investigation, provide at least some mitigating evidence from which the jury could
conclude that the defendant deserves life over death."' The Supreme Court has over-
turned death sentences where defense counsel failed to investigate and present miti-
gating evidence for the defendant, reasoning that, "[h]ad the jury been able to place
petitioner's excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a rea-
sonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance."" 9
The defense counsel's investigation may produce multiple mitigating factors in
many shapes and forms. 2° Mitigating factors that are often presented by the defendant
include childhood abuse, substance abuse or addiction, a caring family, the absence of
a criminal record, the defendant's age, the defendant and his family's mental history,
"1 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
112 Id.
"3 Id. at 604-05.
"1 Bowers, supra note 41, at 1065.
"1 Gary Goodpaster, The Trialfor Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 334-35 (1983).
116 See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986).
"' Id. at 4-5 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604).
118 See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 513 (2003).
"1 Id. at 537.
120 See Garvey, supra note 27, at 1559-60 (showing results of a survey asking jurors what
mitigating and aggravating factors would make them vote for life or for death).
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whether the defendant had a background of extreme poverty, defendant's remorse,
and whether defendant was ever institutionalized and received the necessary help.'2
The Supreme Court has refined its mitigating factor jurisprudence by allowing
the states a modicum of flexibility in structuring what juries may do with the miti-
gating evidence they hear. First, although a court cannot prevent the defendant from
presenting all relevant mitigating information, each individual state retains the power
to "structure" how a capital jury receives the mitigating evidence. 2 For example,
a state may require that the jury consider some mitigating evidence, such as youth-
fulness, only as it bears on particular issues made relevant by the death penalty statute
itself, such as future dangerousness.' 23 Moreover, the Supreme Court has declared
that a capital sentencing statute that requires the defendant to bear the burden of estab-
lishing all mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence does not
violate the Constitution.'24 On the other hand, a state may not require that the jury
find mitigating factors unanimously or beyond a reasonable doubt for individual jurors
to consider them.'25 Thus, although states retain some power to define the structure
of the consideration of mitigating factors, they work within the narrow parameters
of the Eighth Amendment.26
C. The Unique Function of the Capital Jury
Following Furman, the Supreme Court moved towards an Aristotelian
need to rely on the practical judgment of persons to explore the
moral "contours" of the crooked way general legal rules fit par-
ticular circumstances[:] Aristotle drew a distinction between legal
justice, defined by general rules, and moral equity, defined as the
discretionary judgment it takes to "rectify" the inevitable short-
comings of general legal rules. His distinction seems implicit in
the Court's emphasis on the need to leave the sentencing judge or
jury with the obligation and the authority to consider any mitigat-
121 Vivian Berger, "Black Box Decisions" on Life or Death-If They 're Arbitrary, Don't
Blame the Jury: A Reply to Judge Patrick Higginbotham, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1067,
1082 (1991); Garvey, supra note 27, at 1559-60.
122 See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 362 (1993) ("States are free to structure and shape
consideration of mitigating evidence ...
123 Id.
24 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,650 (1990). The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
are not violated by putting the burden on the defendant, to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence, the existence of mitigating circumstances that are "sufficiently substantial to call
for leniency." Id.
125 DIETER, supra note 65, at 23.
'2 Garvey, supra note 27, at 1561.
1106
INFORMATION OVERLOAD AND THE CAPITAL JURY
ing factor and to withhold imposing a death sentence even as a
pure act of mercy or leniency.
27
Moreover, as noted by Justice Stevens, the death penalty "is the one punishment that
cannot be prescribed by a rule of law as judges normally understand such rules, but
rather is ultimately understood only as an expression of the community's outrage-its
sense that an individual has lost his moral entitlement to live."'28 The states generally
have delegated to the jury the task of deciding whether the defendant lives or dies,
requiring, during the penalty phase, that thejury compare the aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors. 129
The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not requirejury sentencing
in capital cases. 130 Nevertheless, in the overwhelming majority of death penalty
jurisdictions, the jury performs the sentencing task. The jury is clothed with this
distinctive role because it is thought, in determining whether the defendant deserves
life or death, that capital jurors represent the "conscience of the community."13'
Therefore, the capital jury takes on a unique function within the capital punishment
context, transforming from a creature merely following the letter of the law, to indi-
viduals applying notions of morality, mercy, and emotion, to ultimately determine the
defendant's final punishment.132
Because each capital juror relies heavily on morals, ethics, and mercy while con-
templating, and ultimately determining, whether to impose death, it is inevitable that
each juror will infuse very personal considerations into the ultimate punishment
decision. This in and of itself contributes to the impact the capital trial has on the
jury. The capital jury's task requires each juror to undergo intense personal delibera-
tion, and is thus filled with uneasiness and apprehension.'33 Because mercy, morality,
and emotion play such intricate roles in the capital jury's punishment decision, the
impact of aggravating and mitigating factors upon the capital jury is increasingly
intense. Capital jurors must not only absorb the mere facts of the case, but they must
also perform their task in an unfamiliar setting while applying novel, and often
ambiguous, legal concepts:
127 Abramson, supra note 18, at 120-21 (citing ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics 141
(Martin Ostwald trans., Prentice Hall 1962); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Caldwell
v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985)).
12 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,468-69 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
129 Bowers, supra note 41, at 1066.
'30 See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 460-65; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 612-13
(2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
' DIETER, supra note 65, at 22.
132 See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 468-69 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133 Bowers, supra note 41, at 1071.
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The dislocation from the routines of everyday life, the unfamiliar-
ity of the sentencing task, the public exposure to which it subjects
the jury, the unsettling experience of learning about a frightening
crime in minute and graphic detail, the impact of finding another
human being guilty of such a crime, and then the necessity of
switching "frames" of understanding from one phase of the trial
to the other, the incommensurable nature of the two types of evi-
dence that must be "weighed" in the penalty phase, the inherent
subjectivity and moral relativity of the penalty decision, and the
burden of choosing between life and death can all create ambigu-
ity... [and] can leave the jury with uncertainties and anxiety
about what they are supposed to do."M
Ultimately, the combination of all the requirements discussed above, situational im-
perfections and inner, emotional factors result in the capital jury having to not only
reconcile death and life, but to also analyze and process quantities of information
above and beyond that of a typical jury.
UI. INFORMATION OVERLOAD
Despite the Supreme Court's attempt to reduce arbitrary death penalty results,
critics have argued that arbitrariness continues to plague the capital punishment
system. One scholar has argued that the excessive numbers of aggravating factors in
many jurisdictions render those death penalty regimes virtually indistinguishable from
the pre-Furman schemes that subjected every murderer to death and vested full
discretion in the jury, thus permitting arbitrariness to continuously infect the death
penalty system.'35 Moreover, Justices Blackmun136 and Scalia"' have taken the
position that the Furman line of cases, mandating that capital punishment schemes
channel the capital jury's discretion and narrow the class of eligible defendants, 13 is
inherently inconsistent with the WoodsonlLockett line of cases, requiring that capital
punishment schemes utilize individualized sentencing. 39 Both have argued that the
"3 Lorelei Sontag, Deciding Death: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of Penalty Phase Jury
Instructions and Capital Decision-Making 80 (June 1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California, Santa Cruz) (printed by UMI Dissertation Services).
135 See Kirchmeier, supra note 31, at 4.
136 See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1151-52 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.) (describing the incompatible commands of death penalty jurisprudence).
131 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (stating he would no longer apply the principle of Woodson and
Lockett that a sentencer may not be prohibited from considering any mitigating factor).
138 Kirchmeier, supra note 4, at 346; see also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428
(1980).
119 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
1108
INFORMATION OVERLOAD AND THE CAPITAL JURY
inconsistency between the Furman and Woodson/Lockett lines of cases have effec-
tively diluted the Court's endeavor to eradicate arbitrariness."4 Without taking a
position on these criticisms, we now explore the marketing- and business-based
doctrine of information overload, which suggests an additional way in which arbitrari-
ness infuses the death penalty.
A. Mhat Is Information Overload?
Because Americans thrive on the freedom and the potential value of choice, the
notion that more choice is better has become standard in American society. Conven-
tional theory posits "that more choices are preferable to fewer choices."' 14' Most
social scientists agree that, because people are rational human beings, additional
options and choices enhance our society. 142 People value information. '4 They "want
information because it is empowering. Information enables those who have it to make
informed decisions .... "'44 Thus, information is categorically considered valuable. 1
4
The classic hypothesis presumes that decision-making quality and information
quantity form a linear function; as information quantity increases, so does decision
quality.
46
Despite this seemingly compelling conclusion, persuasive evidence to the contrary
has been developed. "Psychologists, economists, policy-makers, sociologists, philoso-
phers and ordinary people" are becoming increasingly concerned that Americans have
too much information. 47 They have asserted that the value of information, like the
value of most things we think are generally good, is contingent, not essential, and
depends on circumstances and conditions other than the conceptual properties of
information. 4' We do ourselves no favor, they argue, when we equate liberty too
directly with choice, as if we necessarily increase freedom by increasing the number
280, 304 (1976).
'" Kirchmeier, supra note 4, at 346-49.
14' Natalie Ram, Tiered Consent and the Tyranny of Choice, 48 JURIMETRICS 253, 269
(2008).
142 BARRY ScHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE 19 (2004).
"' See Kenneth Einar Himma, The Concept of Information Overload: A Preliminary Step
in Understanding the Nature ofa Harmful Information-Related Condition, 9 ETHICS & INFO.
TECH. 259,260 (2007) (explaining various views on the value of information); see also Francis
Heylighen, Complexity and Information Overload in Society: Why Increasing Efficiency Leads
to Decreasing Control 11 (Apr. 12,2002) (unpublished draft paper), available at http:llpespmc I
.vub.ac.be/Papers/Info-Overload.pdf ("During most of history, information was a scarce
resource that was of the greatest value to the small elite that had access to it.").
144 Troy A. Paredes, Blinded By the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences
For Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 431 (2003).
41 See Himma, supra note 143, at 260.
'" See Paredes, supra note 144, at 440.
" l Himma, supra note 143, at 260.
148 Id.
110920091
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1089
of options available.'49 Accordingly, researchers have arrived at the nuanced proposi-
tion that although "some choice is good [it] doesn't necessarily mean that more choice
is better."'5°
This conclusion is grounded in the central insight that "bounded rationality" con-
fines people's decision-making abilities.' 5 ' The bounded rationality theory suggests
that "people can only process a finite amount of information during any particular
period of time."' 52 Thus, although choice is an essential part of American society,
abundant choice is self-defeating, resulting in uninspired decision-making, decreased
satisfaction, and remorse when choices are made.'53 Americans' desire to receive
abundant information, in order to enhance our decision-making ability, has ultimately
resulted in poor decision making and subsequently poorer decisions. This phe-
nomenon is commonly known as information overload.
The phrase "information overload" describes the situation where an individual
receives too much information, thus becoming overwhelmed and confused.' 55 Infor-
mation overload takes on distinct, yet similar, definitions, depending upon the context
in which it is being analyzed. The notion of information overload has been developed
primarily within the marketing and business context,'56 in studying such areas as
accounting,'57 management, 58 and, particularly, consumer research.'59 The classic,
"49 See id. at 270.
150 ScHwARTZ, supra note 142, at 3. Not all researchers have agreed with this proposition.
See, e.g., David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 301 (1986) ("[T]he information overload
idea-that too much information causes disfunction-is a myth."). Because a response to this
minority view would not be complete without exploring how information overload might affect
capital jurors, we postpone such a response until Part Il.A infra.
'.' Paredes, supra note 144, at 440-41.
152 Id.
1 Ram, supra note 141, at 269.
i See generally id. (discussing the pitfalls of abundant choice, including arbitrary selection
and regret).
"' Kathleen M. Sutcliffe & Karl E. Weick, Information Overload Revisited, in HANDBOOK
OF ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING 56 (W. Starbuck & G. Hodgkinson eds., 2008).
156 See Martin J. Eppler & Jeanne Mengis, The Concept of Information Overload: A
Review of Literature from Organization Science, Accounting, Marketing, MIS, and Related
Disciplines, 20 INFO. Soc'Y 325,326 (2004) (examining the theoretical basis of information
overload discourse in these disciplines).
157 See, e.g., Allen G. Schick et al., Information Overload: A Temporal Approach, 15
Accr., ORGS. & SOc'Y 199, 199-220 (1990) ("Given that accountants are major providers
of information to decision makers, information overload has become an important accounting
concern.").
158 See, e.g., Mary-Liz Gris6 & R. Brent Gallupe, Information Overload: Addressing the
Productivity Paradox in Face-to-Face Electronic Meetings, 16 J. MGMT. INFO. SYSTEMS 157,
157-85 (1999) (examining how to lead more effective meetings in the face of information
overload).
"' See, e.g., Jacob Jacoby, Perspectives on Information Overload, 10 J. CONSUMER RES.
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general concept of information overload "compares the individual's information-
processing capacity (i.e., the quantity of information one can integrate into the
decision-making process within a specific time period) with the information-process-
ing requirements (i.e., the amount of information one has to integrate in order to
complete a task)."'1  Over the past decade, the term "information overload" has
morphed into idioms such as "information glut," "data smog,"'61 and information
fatigue. 62 Now, "[w]hat was once a term grounded in cognitive psychology has
evolved into a rich metaphor used outside the world of academia."' 63
Herbert Simon, the "godfather" of information overload, developed a working
model of information overload."M Simon used an inverted U-curve model, shown in
Figure 1, to represent the point at which the decision maker supposedly experiences
information overload.'65 As the inverted U-curve suggests, the information overload
point occurs "where the amount of information actually integrated into the decision
begins to decline."'" Beyond this point, decision quality decreases and the decision
maker begins to remove him- or herself from the decision-making process. 167
432,432-36 (1984); Kevin Lane Keller & Richard Staelin, Effects of Quality and Quantity
ofInformation on Decision Effectiveness, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 200,200-13 (1987); Naresh
K. Malhotra, Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer Decision
Making, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 436, 436-40 (1984).
'60 Eppler & Mengis, supra note 156, at 326. Eppler notes that this basic information
overload definition can also be elucidated using the following modus operandi: "information
processing requirements > information processing capacities." Id.; see also Gary L. Hunter,
Information Overload: Guidance for Identifying When Information Becomes Detrimental to
Sales Force Performance, 24 J. PERS. SELLING & SALES MGMT. 91, 91 (2004) (defining
information overload as "a state induced by a level of information exceeding the ability of an
individual to assimilate or process during a given unit of time"); David Glen Mick et al.,
Choose, Choose, Choose, Choose, Choose, Choose, Choose: Emerging and Prospective
Research on the Deleterious Effects of Living in Consumer Hyperchoice, 52 J. Bus. ETHICS
207,208 (2004) (defining information overload as the "multiplicative function of the amount
of product attributes and alternative information available for a single decision"); Charles A.
O'Reilly, 1I, Individuals and Information Overload in Organizations: Is More Necessarily
Better?, 23 ACAD. MGMT. J. 684,684 (1980) (declaring that information overload occurs when
information processing capabilities and the information loads encountered are mismatched);
Cheri Speier et al., The Influence of Task Interruption on Individual Decision Making: An
Information Overload Perspective, 30 DECIsION SCi. 337, 338 (1999) (defining information
overload as a state induced "when the amount of input to a system exceeds its processing
capacity").
161 Speier et al., supra note 160, at 337.
162 See generally RICHARD SAUL WURMAN, INFORMATION ANxIETY 2 (2001) (examining
the effects of the explosion of non-information that does not actually inform).
163 Speier, supra note 160, at 337.
'64 Eppler & Mengis, supra note 156, at 326 (noting that the "inverted U-curve represents
the first important definition of information overload").
165 Id. at 328 (displaying a chart of various definitions of "information overload").
166 Id.
167 Id.
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Information
Overload
Information Load
Figure 1: Information Overload as the Inverted U-curve
Recently, researchers and scholars have begun to define information overload
based upon subjective factors and causes. For example, one researcher stated that
"[i]nformation overload occurs when the decision maker estimates he or she has to
handle more information than he or she can efficiently use," 6' and another noted
that information overload develops when the "'[a]mount of reading matter ingested
exceeds the amount of energy available for digestion, the surplus accumulates and
is converted by stress and over-stimulation into the unhealthy state known as IOA
(Information Overload Anxiety)."' 169 These researchers clearly premise the infor-
mation overload syndrome occurring not only upon external influences (i.e., large
quantities of information), but also due to internal influences (i.e., personal skills,
reasoning abilities, etc.). 170
Two different strands of information overload have surfaced. 71 The first strand
holds that "decision makers experience information overload when presented with
an overwhelming number of options that must be considered simultaneously." 72 This
strand represents the typical marketing situation where a person attempts to choose
one particular item from a multitude of choices 173-for example, the toothpaste pur-
chaser discussed in the Introduction to this Article.
The second strand holds that "decision makers experience information overload
when presented with an overwhelmingly complex decision, even when only a few
168 id.
"6 WuRMAN, supra note 162, at 209 (quoting Lance Shaw, TECH. REV. (Jul.-Aug. 1979)).
170 See id.
17' Ram, supra note 141, at 270.
172 Id.
173 id.
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options are available, because of the many details or attributes of each option that need
to be considered."' 74 This strand represents the situation in which a person has to en-
gage in making an exceedingly complex decision and, although only a few choices must
be simultaneously considered, the person experiences information overload because
each choice has a multitude of details or subparts.' This second type of information
overload might occur when a person contemplates buying a house. The purchaser
may only have two houses which she is considering, but each house requires analysis
of its innumerable characteristics: cost, aesthetics, durability, size, age, location, yard
size, layout, inspection results, disclosures, distance to work, neighborhood safety,
county assessment, school quality, convenience to shopping, distance from main thor-
oughfare, and many, many others. Layer on top of these multifarious factors the dif-
ficulty that arises when two or more people-say a married couple with teenaged
children-attempt to make the decision together. Although the choice might be only
between house A and house B, each option's subparts and corresponding details might
cause the decision makers to become overwhelmed and confused, thus resulting in
decision-making anxiety and information overload.'76
Research on information overload has focused primarily upon the first axis.
Moreover, most of this research has remained confined to the business and marketing
contexts.'77 However, there is little reason to think that the causes and consequences
of information overload are not more generalizable.
B. Causes of Information Overload
The precise cause of information overload is unknown. However, scholars and
researchers have unearthed various factors which, taken in conjunction, contribute
to information overload. The relevant factors include limitations in cognitive capa-
bilities, time constraints, and other factors related to the particular information and
the task at hand.
1. Limited Cognitive Capabilities
Research indicates that "the human mind is not of limitless capacity and that the
information available for decision making can only be of some finite magnitude be-
fore the mind is simply overwhelmed."''l7 Herbert Simon is credited with being the
first to recognize that "people have limited cognitive abilities to store, process, and
interpret information."' 79 Simon coined the term "bounded rationality," claiming
174 id.
175 See id.
176 See id.
177 See id.
178 id.
179 Paredes, supra note 144, at 435.
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that "[c]ognitive capabilities are scarce resources that have to be allocated; because
of limited cognitive capabilities, people cannot attend to all the information made
available to them and cannot evaluate all their choices perfectly."'' 80 Because humans
suffer from limited cognitive capabilities, we are unable to consider every aspect of
every decision. If we attempted to do so, the decision-making process would morph
into a complex, distressing, and time-consuming experience.'' The inverted U-curve,
displayed above at Figure 1, graphically portrays Simon's information overload con-
cept, noting the point where information transforms from beneficial to harmful, sub-
sequently lowering decision quality.8 2
2. Time Constraints
The impact of time on information overload first became evident when researchers
and scholars began incorporating time into the very definition of information over-
load.8 3 For example, one researcher claimed that information overload occurred
when "the demands on an entity for information processing time exceed its supply
of time."'84 Time pressure causes the decision maker to relinquish partial control over
his or her ability to retain and process information, resulting in feelings of anxiety
and stress which ultimately contribute, on some level, to information overload and
decreased decision-making ability.'85 Also, time constraints may cause a person who
is currently bombarded with a large quantity of information to ignore essential and
relevant details, or, in the alternative, fail to fully consider the details when additional
information is presented.8 6
In addition, distractions and interruptions have a direct proportionate impact on
time pressure, thus potentially increasing information overload.'87 Scholars agree
that distractions and interruptions can contribute to information overload because
of the restrictions they put on time:
[D]istractions lead to the buildup of queues which can lead di-
rectly to overload, or can lead indirectly to overload by decreasing
the amount of time to work on something and increasing time
180 Id.; see also Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, 68
AM. ECON. REv. 1,9-14 (1978); Herbert A. Simon, Theories ofDecision-Making in Economics
and Behavioral Science, 49 AM. ECON. REv. 253, 272-73 (1959).
181 Paredes, supra note 144, at 435.
182 Eppler & Mengis, supra note 156, at 326.
183 Id. at 326-27.
's Schick et al., supra note 157, at 215.
i85 Minhi Hahn et al., The Effects of Time Pressure and Information Load on Decision
Quality, 9 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 365, 366 (1992).
6 Id. at 377.
i' Sutcliffe & Weick, supra note 155, at 60.
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pressure. Interruptions break the flow of work and often bring it
to a halt. As interruptions take time away from present activity,
they fuel feelings of time pressure. Interruptions also increase
information processing demands by forcing decision makers to
shift attention to the interruption, to contemporaneously attend
to competing inputs, or to focus or narrow attention on one task
at the expense of others.'88
In other words, every time a person is interrupted or distracted, the person's concen-
tration breaks and suffers, thus increasing the probability that the person is going to
experience information overload.'89
3. Additional Idiosyncratic Factors
Although cognitive limitations and time constraints contribute significantly to
information overload, characteristics idiosyncratic to each decision-making proce-
dure can exacerbate the problem. First, "the characteristics of [the] information,
(i.e., the qualitative dimension) are [also] seen as major overload elements."'' 90 Char-
acteristics such as ambiguity, novelty, difficulty, and intensity all contribute to the
uncertainty level associated with the information, thus inducing information over-
load.19' Researchers Simpson and Prusak note that merely improving information
quality, "(e.g., conciseness, consistency, comprehensibility, etc.) ... can improve the
information-processing capacity of the individual, as he or she is able to use high-
quality information more quickly and better than ill-structured, unclear information."'' 92
In addition to the characteristics of the information itself, research indicates that
the makeup of the individual decision maker, and thus that person's personality traits,
are important factors affecting information overload. 93 Particularly, features such
as personal abilities, experience level, and motivation may affect a person's process-
ing and cognitive abilities. " For example, "[a] person who is highly involved" in the
decision-making process "is more motivated to keep up with the pace of input, in the
sense of more completely and intelligently processing the information, than is a less-
involved person."' 95 Therefore, a highly motivated person is less likely to experience
information overload than a less-motivated person.' 96
188 id.
189 Eppler & Mengis, supra note 156, at 331.
'90 Id. at 327.
'91 Id. at 331.
"9 Id. (citing C.W. Simpson & L. Prusak, Troubles with Information Overload-Moving
From Quantity to Quality in Information Provision, 15 INT'L J. INFO. MGMT. 413 (1995)).
193 Id.
194 Id.
19' Hahn et al., supra note 185, at 367-68.
'96 See id.
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Finally, researchers believe that the nature of the specific task at hand can affect
information overload. 97 Specifically, the less often the task is utilized and the more
complex the task is, the more likely is information overload. '98 A complex, unfamiliar
task invites sensations such as "stress, confusion, pressure, anxiety, and low motivation,"
which cumulatively contribute significantly to the onset of information overload.' 99
C. Consequences of Information Overload
Just as with any syndrome, people respond in a variety of ways when experiencing
information overload. When information overload attacks an individual, the person
"has difficulties in identifying the relevant information, becomes highly selective and
ignores a large amount of information, has difficulties in identifying the relationship
between details and the overall perspective, needs more time to reach a decision, and
finally does not reach a decision of adequate accuracy."2 "° Moreover, information
overload often diverts the decision maker's attention away from relevant issues and
blinds them to more important matters. 20 1 He or she is then likely to take one of two
courses of action, both resulting in hurriedly made decisions and decreased decision
quality. First, the decision maker may "satisfice. 2 °2 Alternatively, he or she may
"opt out. '20 3
1. Satisficing
Decision makers often employ the technique of satisficing "when the information
environment becomes very rich or the decision task becomes very complex relative to
[a person's] available time or expertise." 2' Specifically, the decision maker, whether
consciously or subconsciously, chooses to simply pick an option to end the decision
making process instead of choosing the best option.25 Therefore, the decision maker
opts to satisfice rather than optimize.2 6 "To optimize is to choose the best from the
"9 Eppler & Mengis, supra note 156, at 330-31.
198 Id. at331.
'99 Id. at 328.
200 Id. at 331-33 (citations omitted).
"' Sutcliffe & Weick, supra note 155, at 59.
202 Grether et al., supra note 150, at 279.
203 See Ram, supra note 141, at 272.
o Grether et al., supra note 150, at 279; see also Paredes, supra note 144, at 436 ("Simon
concludes that people 'satisfice' rather than 'optimize,' especially when faced with complex
choices.").
205 Grether et al., supra note 150, at 279.
206 Id.; see also Malhotra, supra note 159, at 438 ("While consumers may employ heuristics
to limit the intake of information, these heuristics may often involve a tradeoff between sim-
plifying and optimizing.... Hence, in the context of decision making, it is entirely possible
for a [person] to adopt a choice heuristic that may limit cognitive strain but that may not lead
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full set of ... choices; to satisfice is to do as well as one can, given the circum-
stances."2 7 Moreover, "[t]o satisfice rather than optimize is to fail to choose the
most preferred-the 'best'-from among a set of choices. 2 8
When a decision maker decides to satisfice, he or she often sets an "aspiration
level," or a level that satisfies the decision maker.' Typically, the "aspiration level"
is not the equivalent to the best decision that the decision maker could make.210
Rather, the decision maker strives merely to meet the aspiration level, and whether
a better decision is available becomes irrelevant:
In simpler terms, one can think of satisficing as doing the best
as one can under the circumstances. This is not to say that indi-
viduals prefer to satisfice and not optimize. Rather, individuals
satisfice because they do not have the cognitive capabilities to
optimize.
At bottom, satisficing is a coping device for making complex
choices under uncertainty. Decision makers trade off optimizing
the outcome for simplifying the decision process.2 1
Moreover, because decision makers who satisfice attempt to simplify the decision-
making process, they often discard or ignore available, relevant information and,
instead, focus "on a manageable subset of characteristics-in other words, they
essentialize. 2 2 As a result, satisficing often results in a lower quality decision.2"3
2. Opting Out
In addition to satisficing, information overload can also push decision makers
to "'check out' of the decision-making process altogether., 24 Studies indicate two
ways in which decision makers suffering from information overload attempt to break
free from the decision-making process.2 5 In situations "where the number of available
choices is so great as to be 'truly daunting,' rather than trying to choose, 'people
to the 'best' or even to a satisfactory choice."); Paredes, supra note 144, at 436 ("Decision
makers trade off optimizing the outcome for simplifying the decision process.").
7 Grether et al., supra note 150, at 279.
208 Id. at 287 (emphasis added).
209 Paredes, supra note 144, at 436.
210 See id.
211 Id.
212 Ram, supra note 141, at 270.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 272.
215 Id.
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may disengage, choosing almost arbitrarily to complete the process.' '2 6 In contrast,
in situations where the decision maker must make multiple complex, intrinsic deci-
sions virtually simultaneously, or within close proximity of one another, the decision
maker experiences "psychological[ ] fatigu[e]," and thus subsequent decisions are
likely to embrace more arbitrary and illogical factors.217 As a result, because coupled
decision making "is strenuous and fatiguing," and subsequently leads to declining
will, decision makers simply choose to "opt out" of the decision-making process.2"'
l. THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF INFORMATION OVERLOAD ON THE CAPITAL JURY
The Supreme Court's capital punishmentjurisprudence has, overall, done a com-
mendable job of ensuring that capital jurors have access to all relevant information
necessary to make the life-or-death decision. Nonetheless, negligible attention has
been paid to how jurors actually use this information to reach their ultimate decision,
or to whether jurors are actually receiving too much information.
A. Do Capital Jurors Experience Information Overload?
The logical starting point is to ask whether, in fact, capital jurors actually suffer
from information overload during capital trials. A minority of scholars assert that
the problem of information overload is non-existent. This position has been set
forth most strenuously by David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz, and Louis L. Wilde
(hereinafter GSW), who, in a 1986 article on consumer law, boldly wrote that "the
information overload idea-that too much information causes disfunction-is a
myth. '2 9 They concluded that "the information overload idea should be dropped
from legal discourse. 221
On one level, GSW can be read as claiming that information overload never
occurs because "when the information environment becomes very rich or the deci-
sion task becomes very complex" the decision maker will employ a number of sim-
plifying strategies in order to optimize their decision within those constraints. 221 Yet,
as Troy Paredes pointed out, constrained optimization is simply another term for
satisficing,222 a term GSW themselves use.223 As Paredes wrote:
216 Id. (quoting Barry Schwartz et al., Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter
of Choice, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1178, 1179 (2002)).
217 Id.
218 Id. at 274.
219 Grether et al., supra note 150, at 301.
220 id.
221 Id. at 279.
222 Paredes, supra note 144, at 436 n.87 ("Satisficing can alternatively be thought of as
optimizing subject to constraints.").
223 Grether et al., supra note 150, at 301 ("[W]hen choice sets become large or choice tasks
complex relative to consumers' time or skill, consumers satisfice rather than optimize.").
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Information overload never suggests that people are not acting
rationally when they adopt simpler decision strategies to cope with
complex tasks. The relevant question is not whether individuals
do the best they can given the information load facing them. One
hopes that they do. Rather, the key question is whether the task
environment can be manipulated in a way that alleviates the rele-
vant constraints and improves decision quality.224
GSW's more cogent critique is based on their empirical conclusion that test sub-
jects who satisfice because of an inability to process large amounts of information
make decisions that are close to ideal.225 They acknowledge that such "task choice
complexity" satisficing, "could in theory create serious problems for consumers." '226
However, they conclude that "the best inference from the evidence is that consumers
do not experience serious problems as a result of the amount of information that mar-
kets and the state now generate." '227 That is to say, when decision makers engage in
this form of satisficing, "the gap between satisficing and optimizing" is small enough
for regulators to ignore.228
Yet, as Melvin Eisenberg pointed out, GSW' s own research does not bear out this
conclusion.229 First, the experiments upon which they rely "suggest that there is a
precipitous decline in the ability of consumers to select their preferred product when
more than a very few alternatives or salient attributes are involved."23 For example,
in one experiment involving subjects choosing the ideal house based on a number of
alternatives with varying attributes, subjects chose correctly 83% of the time when
faced with five alternatives and five attributes per alternative, 58% of the time when
faced with ten alternatives and five attributes per alternative, and 50% of the time when
faced with ten alternatives and ten attributes per alternative.' In another experiment
designed to test subjects' ability to segregate salient from non-salient attributes, and
then to choose the alternative that was best based on the salient attribute(s), subjects
chose correctly 73% of the time when there were two alternatives with two salient
(and no non-salient) attributes, 63% of the time when there were three alternatives
with two salient (and no non-salient) attributes, and 58% of the time when there were
five alternatives and five attributes, only one of which was salient.232 And GSW
acknowledge that "when the choice task became quite complex-four alternatives
224 Paredes, supra note 144, at 443.
225 Grether et al., supra note 150, at 294.
226 Id. at 301.
227 Id. at 294.
228 Id. at 279.
229 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 305 (1986).
230 Id. at 308-09.
2' Grether et al., supra note 150, at 295.
132 Id. at 297.
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and four salient attributes-subjects essentially chose randomly." '233 Eisenberg is
thus correct when he observes that the results regarding decision making involving
even a modicum of complexity "provide scant suppor' 2 for GSW's bold claim that
"task choice complexity" satisficing should cause us no concern.
235
GSW try to excuse the poor performance of test subjects in making moderately
complex decisions by noting that consumers making such decisions will "use sim-
plifying strategies" largely unavailable to the test subjects because of the nature of
the experiments. 236 They point specifically to a screening process apparently used
by some test subjects in whittling down the number of alternatives based on a few
product attributes, where the subjects then compared all remaining products based
on all attributes.237 As Eisenberg points out, such "simplifying strategies" are not
always available even in real-life situations.238 In particular, it is difficult to imagine
how capital jurors might use a similar simplifying strategy without running afoul
of the Supreme Court's admonition that the capital sentencer must consider all miti-
gating evidence.239
It might be argued that jurors in the penalty phase of a capital case are fundamen-
tally unlike the test subjects in the experiments described by GSW. For one thing,
jurors know their decision will have profound consequences. For another, they have
taken an oath to dutifully find the facts and apply theirjudgment. Both characteristics
should make the jurors' decisions closer to the ideal than those of the GSW test sub-
jects. Indeed, the Supreme Court has used this very reasoning in rejecting empirical
data derived from mock jurors.24
But by the same token, we ought to demand a greater correlation between the
actual and the ideal decisions in that context. GSW tout the 63% and 73% correct rate
for test subjects when faced with two salient attributes and two or three alternatives,
respectively, concluding that "the subjects did well, despite considerable variation
in the amount of information supplied."24' We leave it to other researchers in the field
as to whether a 37% error rate in the face of moderately complex information means
that the subjects did "well" when emulating consumers making a product choice.
But if capital jurors are prone to error rates even half as great because they receive
too much information, then 18 to 19% of verdicts in capital penalty-phase trials are
233 Id.
231 Eisenberg, supra note 229, at 309.
235 Grether et al., supra note 150, at 301.
236 Id. at 299.
237 Id. at 295-96.
238 Eisenberg, supra note 229, at 310.
'9 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) (plurality opinion) (holding that
sentencer may not "refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence").
240 See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 171 (1986) (rejecting three studies on
responses of randomly selected non-jurors that did not simulate the jury deliberation process).
'4' See Grether et al., supra note 150, at 299.
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incorrect in the sense that the verdict, be it for life or for death, would be different but
for the inordinate amount of information fed to the jury. GSW concede that "[w]hen
considerably less than all subjects solve the experimental task, there is a 'glass is half
empty or half full' problem in interpreting the results. 242 However acceptable this
view is when consumers are choosing among toothpastes, it should have no place
when jurors are choosing between life and death.
We do not, and perhaps cannot, know whether and to what extent capital jurors
experience information overload. Because of the sanctity and secrecy of jury delib-
erations, it is difficult to accurately reconstruct what occurs during jury deliberations
and, consequently, whether capital jurors actually suffer from information overload.
Moreover, "there is always the risk that the studies and experiments relied on may
be incorrect, and there is a dangerous tendency to take a relatively narrow study or
experiment that is highly qualified in its findings and draw much larger conclusions
and implications that the data may not sustain.' '243 Perhaps most importantly, the
experiments on the overload issue test subjects in contexts in which there is, objec-
tively speaking, an optimal choice. The same can hardly be said of capital jurors who
are exercising their moral judgment as to whether a fellow human should live or die.
This is not to say that information overload cannot plague capital jurors. It is only
to say that it would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether
that is the case.
Yet most scholars who have looked at the issue agree that information overload
is a genuine phenomenon.244 The most vocal critics of the notion of information
overload have failed to show that it does not significantly affect decision making. "At
the very least," there is the possibility, and risk, of information "overload, even if we
do not yet know its precise magnitude ' 241 on capital jurors. In light of current re-
search, a re-examination of the use and over-use of aggravating and mitigating factors
should begin to take a prominent place in our discussions of capital punishment.
B. How Unlimited Aggravating and Mitigating Factors Might Contribute to
Information Overload
Consideration by capital jurors of aggravating and mitigating factors potentially
contribute significantly to their experiencing information overload. Death penalty
cases are saturated with too much information, primarily as a result of the use of
aggravating and mitigating factors.246 Moreover, "[w]hen everything counts, as it does
under Lockett, nothing is dispositive, and subjectivity (although not pure irrationality)
242 Id.
243 Paredes, supra note 144, at 450.
244 See id. at 446-47.
245 Id. at 451.
246 See Bowers, supra note 41, at 1066 (noting "that Zant 'essentially grant[ed] the states
a Lockett right: the penalty trial is to be a free market in information' (alteration in original)).
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holds sway. 247 Therefore, capital jurors are constantly battling with the facts and
evidence presented by both sides in an attempt to process this information so that
they may make an informed, accurate, and proportionate punishment decision.
By allowing the state to present virtually unlimited aggravating evidence,248 and
requiring the state to permit the defendant to present virtually unlimited mitigating
evidence,249 the Supreme Court has essentially endorsed the notion that more infor-
mation is better. In essence, the Supreme Court wants the capital jury to make its
decision based upon all the relevant information. As a result, attorneys flood capital
jurors for days, if not weeks, with huge quantities of information. One study found
that the average length of a capital trial in North Carolina was approximately 14.6
days-including 4.3 days just for the penalty phase-compared to the average 3.8
days of a non-capital trial.25 The capital juror must not only listen to, retain, and
process all the aggravating and mitigating evidence, he or she must also do so in an
emotionally charged, stressful, and unfamiliar situation. These factors combine to
set the stage for capital juror information overload.
Although two strands of information overload have emerged, 251 it is primarily the
second strand that is applicable to the capital punishment context. The second axis
of information overload posits that "decision makers experience information over-
load when presented with an overwhelmingly complex decision, even when only a
few options are available, because of the many details or attributes of each option that
need to be considered., 25 2 In a capital trial, the juror is not faced with an inordinate
number of options. Instead, the jury is faced with two options-life or death. Clearly,
this is nonetheless a complex and difficult decision. Each choice, life or death, impli-
cates a multitude of details which must be considered, including the relevant aggra-
vating and mitigating evidence, as well as notions of mercy and compassion. It is the
combination of these factors, mixed with the overall complexity of the jury's decision,
that could result in capital jurors experiencing information overload.
It is essential to remember that capital trials are "bifurcated-meaning that the
guilt phase and sentencing phase are tried separately."253 Nonetheless, the samejurors
hear evidence and make a decision as to both the defendant's guilt or innocence and
his punishment.254 Therefore, before the sentencing phase even begins, thejurors have
247 Berger, supra note 121, at 1082 (internal citation omitted).
248 See supra Part I.A.
249 See supra Part I.B.
250 PHILIP J. COOK & DONNA B. SLAWSON, THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN
NORTH CAROLINA 61 (1993); see also Justin Brooks & Jeanne Huey Erickson, The Dire Wolf
Collects His Due While the Boys Sit by the Fire: Why Michigan Cannot Afford to Buy into
the Death Penalty, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 877, 891 (1996).
251 See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
252 Ram, supra note 141, at 270.
13 Susan D. Rozelle, The Principled Executioner: Capital Juries' Bias and the Benefits
of True Bifurcation, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769,793 (2006).
2'4 See id. at 793-94.
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already been exposed to many hours of voir dire questions, evidence, and instructions
from the trial judge.255 If the typical capital guilt phase lasts 10.3 days, as in North
Carolina, then capital jurors must listen to, process, and retain roughly seventy-two
hours of information.256 Thus, upon entering the sentencing phase, each juror's pro-
cessing capacity has already been heavily tapped.
Once the sentencing phase begins, the strain on each juror's processing capacity
continues due to his or her exposure to abundant aggravating and mitigating evidence.
Again, to find a defendant to be death-eligible, the jury must find the existence of at
least one aggravating factor.257 However, once it does so, the capital jury can con-
sider all the proved aggravating factors during the selection stage.258 Therefore, it is
to the prosecutor's benefit to attempt to prove multiple aggravating factors. More-
over, in most states, after proving at least one statutory aggravating factor, the prose-
cutor typically is permitted to prove non-statutory aggravating factors.259 In addition,
the prosecutor is permitted to present victim impact evidence, which basically entails
parading multiple witnesses who were related to the victim in front of the jury and
permitting each witness to explain the loss and impact of the victim's death on the
victim's family.26 Finally, the prosecutor is likely to introduce whatever evidence she
can, however tangential to the crime, of the defendant's bad character, in order to
show that he will pose a continuing danger in the future if he is not executed.
The defendant's mitigating evidence contributes to the amount of information
that the jury must analyze and process. As is true of the aggravating evidence, the
amount of mitigating evidence presented in a capital trial varies from case to case.
Nonetheless, the defendant is permitted to present virtually all relevant mitigating evi-
dence,26' and, because compelling mitigating evidence can often sway the jury towards
life, the defendant is likely to err on the side of more rather than less information.262
255 See, e.g., COOK & SLAWSON, supra note 250, at 61 (finding that the average length of a
capital trial in North Carolina is 14.6 days, including both the guilt and sentencing phases).
256 This assumes a seven-hour work day and includes the jury's own deliberations, which
might yield important new data as jurors share their thoughts (one hopes) for the first time.
This figure concededly overestimates the data by also including voir dire and breaks other than
lunch breaks. While little new data may be accumulated during these periods, such delays
themselves may exacerbate the effects of information overload. See infra text accompanying
note 279.
17 See supra Part I.A. 1; see also Stephen Hombuckle, Note, Capital Sentencing Procedure:
A Lethal Oddity in the Supreme Court's Case Law, 73 TEX. L. REV. 441, 447 (1994).
258 Hornbuckle, supra note 257, at 448-49 (explaining that, in weighing states, the jury
is "explicitly instructed" to weigh the proven statutory aggravating factors against the proven
mitigating factors).
9 See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
260 See DIETER, supra note 65, at 20-21.
261 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,604 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 304 (1976).
262 See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
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Also, the function of the capital jury indicates that it will apply mercy, ethics,
and morals to its sentencing decision. 263 Each capital juror is going to infuse his or
her ultimate punishment decision with personal feelings, morals, and emotions.
These factors, in and of themselves, contribute to the amount of information each
juror must process, analyze, balance, and weigh. Every emotion, every moral
insight, and every personal feeling must be taken into consideration.
If each juror's processing capacity is already tapped into before the juror
reaches the sentencing phase, it is reasonable to assume that, upon hearing and
analyzing all the presented aggravating and mitigating evidence, and completing the
required balancing, each juror's processing capacity has been strained, reaching or
exceeding its maximum. The end result is that the pure quantity of information
presented to the capital jury, in and of itself, is likely to cause each juror to suffer
from information overload.
Moreover, other factors besides the mere quantity of information affect the jury
and might lead to information overload. As previously noted, time constraints can
affect the decision-making process and contribute to information overload.264 In
theory, capital jurors are given as much or as little time as needed to reach their
punishment decision.265 In actuality, time constraints during deliberations can come
from two sources. First, fellow jurors who make up their minds early can pressure on-
the-fencejurors to make up their minds quickly and to agree with the early deciders.
Second, the trial judge can pressure, although not coerce,26 the jury into reaching a
verdict in order to end the trial expeditiously.
During the trial itself, time constraints are not likely to contribute to informa-
tion overload. After all, during the trial, time is directly proportional to information
quantity: the more information is given to the jurors, the more time they have to
observe and process it. However, the effect of constant interruptions, and resulting
time implications, may contribute to information overload. Interruptions contribute
to information overload because interruptions force jurors to shift their attention from
the ultimate issue to the interruption, and thus increase feelings of uncertainty and
decreased concentration.267 In capital trials, as in all trials, interruptions may take
the form of discussions at the bench, recesses to obtain witnesses and evidence, and
263 See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,468-70 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that the jury is best suited to "express the conscience of the
community" (citation omitted)).
264 See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 38 ST. MARY'S L.J. 47,203
(2006) ("[T]he length of time a court allows for jury deliberations is a decision within the
sound discretion of the trial court.").
266 See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896) (finding no error injury in-
structions noting the jury's duty to decide the case and instructing dissenting jurors to weigh
their position against the majority).
" See Sutcliffe & Weick, supra note 155, at 60.
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breaks for the judge to fulfill other duties and obligations. Moreover, deliberations
are frequently interrupted as jurors ask for testimony and instructions to be re-read.
Because jurors are often reluctant participants in the first place, and because of the
sheer length of the trial, including both the guilt and penalty phases, interruptions
likely fuel feelings of anxiety, thus pushing jurors to ignore information in order to
make a premature decision to quickly end the deliberation process.
In addition, the characteristics of the evidence may increase the probability of
juror information overload. Information characteristics such as "ambiguity, novelty,
complexity, and intensity" often contribute to information overload.268 Each of these
characteristics applies to information presented at a capital trial. First, as in any trial,
evidence can be ambiguous, with each side urging its respective interpretation. Jurors
also may not understand why the prosecutor or defendant is presenting certain evi-
dence, thus causing jurors to view the information as ambiguous. Additionally, both
novelty and intensity of the information are obviously significant factors in a typical
capital trial. The typical capital juror, one would hope, is unlikely to be familiar with
either the horrid details surrounding the types of killings that are death-eligible or
the intimate details of the life and background of the typical capital murderer, often
including childhood abuse and deprivation, mental illness and brain injury, and drug
and alcohol abuse. Moreover, because information relating to such issues as future
dangerousness, on the one hand, and the effect of childhood abuse, on the other, are
typically the province of experts-by definition, "beyond the ken of the average
juror"'269-the difficulty of thejurors in understanding the information they are given
may be enhanced.
Beyond the characteristics of the information, as previously noted, the complexity
and novelty of the task itself may also exacerbate the effects of information over-
load.27 The capital jury makes its decision in a stressful, unfamiliar setting.27' It is
unlikely that a juror currently sitting on a capital jury has ever previously been on a
capital jury, or perhaps any jury for that matter, and therefore the entire capital trial
process will be alien, novel, and intimidating. Moreover, the overall life and death
decision is complex and intense.272 Not only is it difficult for a capital juror to make
the decision whether another human being deserves to live or die,273 the task is also
complex because jurors struggle to "understand the abstruse legal framework that the
courts have constructed around the death penalty. 274 In particular, the jurors are
268 Eppler & Mengis, supra note 156, at 331.
269 United States v. Castillo, 924 F.2d 1227, 1232 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
829 (1994).
270 See Eppler & Mengis, supra note 156, at 331.
271 See Sontag, supra note 134, at 80.
272 DIETER, supra note 65, at 22 ("[Jurors] have a difficult time determining who should
live and die because it is an inherently inscrutable process.").
273 See id. at 24 (describing the emotional impact on jurors).
274 Id. at 22.
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often asked to weigh incommensurables: the utilitarian-based idea that very danger-
ous offenders must be permanently incapacitated by death, added to the harm-based
retributivist275 values reflected by victim impact evidence, balanced against the intent-
based retributivist notion of diminished culpability often underlying the mitigating
evidence. One might as well ask the jury to add the mass of an object to its color and
divide by its shape.276 To make matters worse, because different values are being
compared, the same evidence--evidence of mental illness, for example-might have
aggravating and mitigating significance for the jury at the same time, "as incoherent
as that mental calculation may be., 277 Empirical research demonstrates the difficulty
jurors have in comparing aggravating and mitigating factors. 278 "Under conditions
of uncertainty and complexity," jurors, like all other rationally bounded decision
makers, "are unable to devise either a fully specified solution to the problem at hand
or to assess fully the probable outcomes of their action. "279 Therefore, the task's com-
plexity and the juror's unfamiliarity with the trial process also may contribute to
information overload.
Information overload theory tells us that, ultimately, overloaded jurors will-
instead of attempting to process and weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence
as instructed by the court--choose to disengage from the process or arbitrarily make
a life or death decision. 280 That is, the impact of information overload on the capital
jury may cause each affected juror to satisfice or opt out. Each juror may set an
"aspiration level," meaning the juror, consciously or subconsciously, decides that once
the prosecutor proves a certain number of aggravating factors,28' or the defendant
275 See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm Under
the Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERs L.J. 725, 735-36 (1988) (distinguishing
"harm-based" from "intent-based" retributivism).
276 See Covey, supra note 54, at 259 ("[T]he weighing paradigm is fundamentally in-
coherent, because aggravators and mitigators are simply not comparable."); Scott W. Howe,
Furman's Mythical Mandate, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 435, 476-77 (2007) (noting that
jurors are typically "not told how to weigh any particular factor or what overriding question
should determine their decision"); Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, A Punishment
in Search of a Crime: Standards for Capital Punishment in the Law of Criminal Homicide,
46 MD. L. REv. 115, 120 (1986) (criticizing the Model Penal Code approach for requiring
a jury to weigh "the incommensurable"); cf. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983
Sup. CT. REv. 305, 394 ("[A] moral formula cannot... achieve [its] goal, so long as we
cannot translate differing and competing values into a 'universal currency' for comparative
measurement." (quoting BERNARD WI.JAMS, MORAL LUCK 77 (1981))).
277 Covey, supra note 54, at 254.
278 Richard L. Wiener, Death Penalty Research in Nebraska: How Do Judges and Juries
Reach Penalty Decisions?, 81 NEB. L. REv. 757, 768-69 (2002) (reviewing several studies
concerning juror comprehension of mitigating circumstances).
279 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking In Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1, 21 (2002).
28 See supra Part H.C.
2' See Covey, supra note 54, at 262 ("[R]esearch suggests that sentencing decisions often
turn on little more than the number of statutory aggravating factors established: The more
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presents a certain amount of mitigating evidence, thejuror will arbitrarily pick death
or life.282 In other words, once the standard the capital juror sets for him- or herself
is met, the juror selects a pre-determined choice.
If a juror were to satisfice in this manner, the juror would ignore or disregard
other relevant information.283 Instead, the juror would select which information he
or she desires to process and become blind to all additional information. The juror
might engage in this process subconsciously,' because it is the only method in which
the juror can process the inordinate amount of information that has plagued his or
her processing capabilities. Because this hypothetical capital juror is satisficing,
instead of optimizing, he or she is picking the best choice under the circumstances
and not the overall best choice.
The other option for the information-overloaded capital juror, "opting out," is
unusually easy to do in this context. On a twelve-person jury, it is all too easy for one
or more overloaded jurors to "pass the buck" to their fellow jurors by declining to come
to independent decisions based on the evidence and simply voting with the majority
in order to end the decision-making process. And because every person has different
cognitive capacities, information overload affects everyone slightly differently,
285
allowing those jurors who choose to opt out to "hide behind" those who choose to
satisfice and those who have not experienced information overload at all.
Obviously, neither consequence of information overload is acceptable in the
context of jury deliberations in the penalty phase of a capital case. Satisficing is
unacceptable because, if any decision-making context warranted the optimal result,
it would be in the capital punishment arena. It is no overstatement to say that the
Supreme Court's entire project in this area over the past three decades has been
founded on the minimization of arbitrariness and caprice in the decision of who ives
and who dies. Turning a blind eye to a system that inevitably causes some jurors
to make that decision by ignoring some highly relevant information while exagger-
ating the importance of trifles would make a mockery of the Supreme Court's death
penalty project.
Opting out is unacceptable for all the same reasons, but also because capital trials
proceed on the assumption that a jury consists of twelve fully engaged people and
not, say, eight fully engaged people and four people who have checked out of the
aggravators found, the more likely the defendant will receive a death sentence .... ");
Wiener, supra note 278, at 769 (discussing this phenomenon among Nebraska judges).
282 See Paredes, supra note 144, at 436 (noting that the aspiration level does not equal the
best available decision).
283 Eppler & Mengis, supra note 156, at 333 (explaining that when a person satisfices, he
or she has trouble identifying relevant information and tends to ignore significant amounts
of information).
28 See Grether et al., supra note 150, at 279 (indicating that when a decision maker satis-
fices, he or she, whether consciously or subconsciously, ultimately makes the required decision
arbitrarily because of information overload).
285 See supra text accompanying notes 193-96.
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decision-making process. Federal286 and state constitutional 287 and statutory 211
provisions typically require that verdicts in criminal cases, and particularly verdicts
of life or death, be made unanimously by twelve jurors. It would violate the spirit,
if not the letter, of such provisions if even a single juror's concurrence with a ver-
dict was the product, not of actual assent, but of a complete failure to consider all
the evidence.
In sum, if capital jurors do suffer from information overload, they are ultimately
sentencing defendants to death, not based upon the belief that defendants are un-
worthy to live, as determined by a comparison of aggravating and mitigating evidence,
but because the capital jury is unable to adequately make this crucial decision and
therefore relies upon coping strategies such as satisficing and opting out. Under the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence, with its focus on minimizing arbitrariness, this result
is simply unacceptable.
IV. EASING THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF INFORMATION OVERLOAD ON THE
CAPITAL JURY
Because it is likely that capital jurors suffer from information overload, the
possibility exists that jurors are disengaging from the decision-making process and
arbitrarily choosing a life or death sentence, not based solely on the relevant evidence,
but merely to end the decision-making process. Thus, the end result is a more arbi-
trary and capricious capital punishment system. By attempting to restrain the jury's
discretion and create individualized capital sentencing through the use of virtually
unlimited mitigating and aggravating factors, the Supreme Court may have, ironi-
cally, created a system overflowing with arbitrariness. Because of the likely impact
of information overload on the capital juror, it is essential to reduce the amount of
information presented to the capital jury in order to ensure that each capital juror is
both focusing upon the most relevant information and making the life or death deci-
sion by analyzing and balancing all relevant factors. Therefore, it is bad policy to
286 See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930) (requiring twelve-person
jury under the Sixth Amendment); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898) (same); cf.
Springville v. Thomas, 166 U.S. 707 (1897) (requiring unanimous verdict in civil cases under
the Seventh Amendment). It remains an open question whether these decisions survive Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), which held that the twelve-person jury requirement does not
apply to the states, and Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), which held the same regard-
ing the unanimity requirement. See George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide:
Resurrecting the Framers' Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145,
170-71 (2001).
287 See, e.g., TEx. CONST. art. V, § 13 (requiring twelve-person jury in criminal cases); Ngo
v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (requiring jury unanimity in criminal
cases).
288 See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 36.29(a) (Vernon 2008) (requiring unan-
imous twelve-person jury in criminal cases).
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allow the prosecution to present virtually unlimited aggravating evidence, and it is
unsound constitutional law to permit the defense to present virtually unlimited miti-
gating evidence.
A. Cabining Aggravating Factors
Although aggravating circumstances assist in ensuring that the death penalty is
not imposed in an "arbitrary or capricious manner," '289 it is nonetheless bad policy to
allow limitless aggravating factors because they also can contribute significantly to
the capital jurors experiencing information overload. Because, as previously noted,
information overload may causejurors to ignore relevant information and disengage
from the decision-making process,2 ° it is essential to restrict the information pre-
sented to the capital jury. Therefore, legislatures should confine the prosecution, at
the selection stage, to only those aggravating factors, statutory or non-statutory, that
bear strictly on the defendant's culpability for the present crime. This entails eschew-
ing any reliance on future dangerousness and eliminating victim impact evidence.
1. Focusing Aggravating Factors on the Defendant's Culpability for the Crime
One logical way of reducing the amount of aggravating evidence introduced at the
penalty phase of a capital trial is to "direct the fact-finder to focus on culpability." '291
Rather than posing a wide-ranging "inquest into the defendant's past conduct and
present disposition," '292 the sentencing hearing should be a narrowly circumscribed
inquiry into the defendant's blameworthiness for the crime of conviction. That is to
say, the question is neither, "Does this defendant deserve to die for any crime?"-an
inquiry foreclosed by Furman293 -nor, "Does any defendant deserve to die for this
crime?"-an inquiry foreclosed by Woodson294-but rather, "Does this defendant
deserve to die for this crime? ' 295 As Carol and Jordan Steiker cogently observed:
289 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).
290 See Eppler & Mengis, supra note 156, at 331-34.
291 Covey, supra note 54, at 246 (noting retributive theory's impact on capital sentencing).
292 Id. at 247.
293 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (noting the need for reliability in determining
that the death penalty is appropriate in a specific case); see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206 (requiring
that defendant have committed an aggravated form of crime before being sentenced to death).
294 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (holding a mandatory death
penalty unconstitutional).
29' See Covey, supra note 54, at 247 (arguing that whether death is deserved "should not
turn on 'the nature of the offender's character' but rather 'the narrower issue of whether the
offender, at the time of the offense, possessed and had a fair chance' to exercise his or her
'free choice' (quoting Joshua Dressler, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory,
New Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 674-75 (1987)).
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[A]n aversion to mandatory sentencing tells us only that we can-
not consider the offense alone, apart from the offender, in impos-
ing a sentence of death.... [But] it certainly does not necessarily
entail [the] opposite; a consensus against mandatory sentencing
does not lead us inexorably to unconstrained consideration of all
individualizing circumstances.296
In addition, as Russell Covey has pointed out, the Supreme Court's modem death
penalty jurisprudence has given us an Eighth Amendment that acts as a retributivist-
based constraint on the death penalty. 297 More particularly, this constraint homes in
on the "moral quality of the choice" made by the defendant in committing his crime.298
Pursuant to such a scheme, only aggravating evidence that ties the defendant's en-
hanced culpability to the particulars of the crime committed leads to a finding that
death is warranted. Evidence about the defendant's bad character in general, on the
one hand, or the general harm inflicted by the killing, on the other, does not.
On such a theory, of the twenty-four "special circumstances" that render a de-
fendant eligible for the death penalty in California, only some should be considered
relevant at the selection stage. That the defendant committed a murder in a certain
way-for example, by torture299 -or for a certain reason-for example, for financial
gain 3 -certainly bears on the defendant's culpability for the crime. On the other
hand, that a defendant merely "reasonably should have known"-i.e., was negligent-
that the victim was a peace officer,"0 while it arguably is relevant to death eligibility,
hardly seems to appreciably enhance the defendant's culpability for the crime so as
to become relevant in the selection stage. The same is true of the fact that the defen-
dant has killed before:3 2 while it logically and appreciably delimits the class of
death-eligible defendants, and so is an appropriate eligibility factor, it has nothing
296 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the
Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 844-45 (1992)
(reviewing BEVERLY LOWRY, CROSSED OVER: A MURDER, A MEMOIR (1992)). Steiker &
Steiker limit their culpability-based approach to mitigating circumstances, on the ground that
"most aggravating circumstances serve a proportionality function rather than an individualizing
function." Id. at 854. While this is true of aggravating factors when they act as eligibility
factors, it is not true of aggravating factors when they take on their role as selection factors.
See supra Part I.A. 1-2 (discussing the difference between eligibility and selection factors).
To the extent that aggravating factors are considered at the selection stage, we disagree with
the Steikers "that individualized sentencing will occur primarily through sentencer consideration
of mitigating evidence." Steiker & Steiker, supra, at 855.
297 See Covey, supra note 54, at 227-41.
298 Id. at 233.
29 See CAL. PENALCODE § 190.2(a)(18) (West 2008).
o See id. § 190.2(a)(1).
30' See id. § 190.2(a)(7).
3 See id. § 190.2(a)(2) (applying when defendant was previously convicted of first or
second degree murder).
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to do with whether the defendant deserves death for this crime.3 3 Accordingly, a
culpability-focused selection stage would reduce the amount of aggravating evi-
dence, as to both statutory and non-statutory factors, considered by the jury.
2. Eliminating Evidence of Future Dangerousness
The biggest impact of such a culpability-focused selection stage would be the
elimination of evidence of future dangerousness. After all, asking how dangerous
a defendant is is a quite different question from asking how culpable he is. Elimi-
nating future dangerousness as a factor would eliminate much evidence of "prior
bad acts, bad reputation, post-conviction prison misbehavior, and other evidence
introduced with the principal objective of proving bad character" 30-precisely the
type of evidence that can accumulate and overwhelm a capital jury. Indeed, research
has shown that "juror concerns about the defendant's future dangerousness routinely
eclipse issues concerning the defendant's culpability.
305
Moreover, eliminating evidence of future dangerousness would not only reduce
the sheer amount of information the jury is given to consider, but it would also have
the beneficial side effect of simplifying the jury's task along a different dimension.
When a jury is asked to predict whether another person poses a future danger, it is
asked to perform a role beyond that which jurors are usually given-and one that is
certainly foreign to the average individual. By stark contrast, "the inquiry into culpa-
bility falls squarely within traditional notions of jury competence. '3' 6 Further, the
task of passing judgment is one with which even individuals who have never served
on a jury are familiar, albeit in far less formal and consequential settings.3 7 In addi-
tion, and as a result, no longer would juries be subjected to expert testimony about
future dangerousness. 3" Thus might the penalty selection task, though weighty,
become perhaps less novel, ameliorating the effects of information overload.
3. Eliminating Victim Impact Evidence
Although, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Payne, it is important that the
victim's voice be heard during the sentencing proceeding, the emotional impact
caused by the victim witnesses may cause the capital juror to become overwhelmed,
thus blurring the relevant evidence and prohibiting the capital juror from focusing
303 See Covey, supra note 54, at 249 (noting that "prior criminal convictions... should
not receive special consideration" since they represent transactions that already have been
"paid for" by the defendant).
M4 id.
305 Id. at 253.
306 Id. at 257.
7 See id. ("These judgments necessarily are bound up with conventional notions of
responsibility, based on life experience .....
3 See id. at 258.
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on other aggravating and mitigating evidence. 3' Although this evidence serves a
legitimate purpose, the evidence is tangential to whether this defendant deserves to
live or die for his crime.3"' Because of its resulting information overload impact on
the capital jury, it is a logical category of evidence to be eliminated.
The capital defendant very often does not have firsthand knowledge concerning
the personality of the victim or the nature of the relationship between the victim and
his or her family or community.31 Nor does the defendant typically select the victim
or choose to kill based on the potential impact of the killing on these relationships.3"2
By permitting the jury to consider, and occasionally base its death sentence largely
upon, victim impact evidence "instead of on evidence relevant to... the crime,
[victim impact evidence] diverts the jury's focus to irrelevant information independent
of the decision to kill. ' 313 In addition, victim impact evidence is more likely to cause
jurors to permit pity or anger to infuse the death penalty decision, obscuring the rele-
vant facts with these emotions, and contributing to the already abundant amount of
information each capital juror must process and manage. 34 As previously noted,
capital jurors are bombarded with huge quantities of information and, because of
bounded rationality, are likely unable to process all presented evidence.3 5 Due to the
sheer amount of information presented to the capital jury, it is essential for capital
jurors to focus, not upon emotions, but upon the relevant and necessary facts.
It is true that victim impact evidence serves some legitimate purpose.3 16 As the
Supreme Court has noted, such evidence allows the state to counterbalance the de-
fendant's mitigating evidence.317 However, this will become less necessary if, as
we propose, the Supreme Court restores to the states some meaningful power-and
if the states exercise that power-to restrict the type and amount of mitigating
evidence introduced by the capital defendant.3" 8 Moreover, the state is entirely
capable of reiterating during the penalty phase what is often the most damning
aggravating evidence of all: the evidence presented by the state during the guilt
phase, including descriptions of the crime, and photographs of the crime scene and
3' DIETER, supra note 65, at 21.
310 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 845-46 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
311 See id. at 845 ("[O]rdinarily... the defendant [i]s unaware of the personal circum-
stances of his victim .... ).
312 Nard, supra note 66, at 841 (citing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987)).
313 Id.
314 Id. at 841-42.
315 Paredes, supra note 144, at 434-36.
316 Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
"' Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he State has a legitimate interest
in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding
the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim
is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family."
(citations omitted)).
... See infra Part IV.B.
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the victim.3"9 Finally, the prosecution is able to present evidence supporting the
multitude of available aggravating factors, most of which relate more directly to the
defendant's culpability for the crime. Consequently, victim impact evidence is
fundamentally low in value while, at the same time, the cost of presenting it may be
very high. The purpose behind victim impact evidence is not sufficiently strong to
justify its continued use given the potential information overload effect it has on the
capital jury. It is a logical category of aggravating evidence that state legislatures
should eliminate.
B. Limiting Mitigating Evidence
Just as it is bad policy to allow virtually unlimited aggravating evidence, it is also
unsound constitutional law to permit virtually unlimited mitigating evidence. The
Supreme Court's mandate for individualized assessment" was, of course, developed
with the best of intentions. But because allowing unlimited amounts of mitigating
evidence may well cause capital jurors to suffer from information overload and thus
make an arbitrary and unsupported life or death decision, at least some capital defen-
dants might be harmed rather than helped under current law. Granted, some capital
defendants may be helped by information overload, specifically those whose juries,
because of information overload, sentence them to live where a non-overloaded jury
would reach a verdict of death. But the goal of the Supreme Court's project has
always been the minimization of arbitrariness in the system overall, rather than
sparing as many capital defendants as possible. 32' A system in which capital defen-
dants are arbitrarily spared is as bad as one in which capital defendants are arbitrarily
executed.322
Instead of imposing a free-for-all mitigating evidence standard, the Supreme Court
should revise its capital punishment jurisprudence to allow specific limitations upon
the defendant's ability to present mitigating evidence. The logical way to do so is to
319 See generally DIETER, supra note 65, at 24 (including the statement of one capital juror
who explained that "[dluring the six weeks of the [capital] trial, I became very angry at the
prosecution, because in trying to recreate the horror, they bombarded us with the most grue-
some and painful photographs. The prosecutors were careful to point out where the brain
matter had splattered on the ground...").
31 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 304 (1976).
321 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 603-04.
322 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 296, at 863 ("[P]re-Furman capital sentencing schemes
were objectionable not simply because they resulted in overinclusive application of the death
penalty, but also because they led to underinclusion."). It should be noted that not everyone
agrees with this proposition. See, e.g., David McCord, Judging the Effectiveness of the
Supreme Court's Death Penalty Jurisprudence According to the Court's Own Goals: Mild
Success orMajorDisaster?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 545,567-73 (1997) (arguing that arbitrarily
sparing capital defendants presents constitutional difficulty only if done with invidious motives).
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use the same culpability-focused approach discussed above with regard to aggravating
evidence.323 In the mitigation context, this constraint would limit mitigating evidence
to that which "suggests any impairment of a defendant's capacity to control his or her
criminal behavior, or to appreciate its wrongfulness or likely consequences."324 By
this, we do not mean to limit mitigating factors to those that resemble excuse or
justification defenses to the crime itself,3" exemplified by the Model Penal Code.3 26
Rather, we more broadly conceive of reduced culpability for the crime to include
mitigating evidence that demonstrates factors beyond the defendant's control that may
have, as Paul Litton put it, "interfered with a minimally decent moral education in
comparison to others who were provided that safeguard."'3 27
Much mitigating evidence, such as evidence of mental illness and childhood
abuse, is introduced to show the defendant's reduced culpability for the crime at issue
according to this nuanced definition. Yet much of it is not. Mitigating evidence can
also be introduced to show a defendant's general good character, which in turn may
demonstrate his potential for future contributions to society, and concomitant lack of
dangerousness, as well as his "general desert" of a sentence less than death.328 Yet,
as Steiker and Steiker point out, the general societal consensus that has emerged
around the use of mitigating factors points to their consideration, not as a matter of the
defendant's general culpability, but with regard to his culpability for the crime at
issue.329 Moreover, as Covey demonstrates, only a scheme that limits "the defendant's
constitutional right to proffer mitigating evidence that is relevant to... the extent to
which her conduct was 'freely chosen"'33 is consistent with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment as a retributivist-based limitation on the death
penalty. 3 On this interpretation, "what is pertinent to the issue of culpability is the
323 See supra Part IV.A; see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 296, at 840 ("[Tihe
individualization requirement mandates consideration only of evidence regarding individual
culpability.").
324 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 296, at 846.
31 See generally Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and Deathworthiness:
Differentiating Between Guilt and Punishment in Death Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
21 (1997) (criticizing those who conflate the concept of culpability for guilt-phase purposes
with culpability for purposes of punishment).
326 See supra text accompanying notes 101-03 (describing mitigating factors set forth in
Model Penal Code).
327 Paul Litton, The "Abuse Excuse" in Capital Sentencing Trials: Is it Relevant to
Responsibility, Punishment, or Neither?, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1027, 1033 (2005).
328 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 296, at 847-48; see also Garvey, supra note 27, at 1561
("For the most part, mitigating evidence falls into three broad categories: reduced culpability,
general good character, and lack of future dangerousness.").
329 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 296, at 848-57 (reviewing state statutory schemes and
Model Penal Code). But see Howe, supra note 276, at 468 (asserting that "there are no grounds
to claim a societal consensus" around such a culpability-based view).
330 Covey, supra note 54, at 250.
331 Id. at 227-41.
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moral quality of the choice, not the moral character of the offender. 3 32 Finally, since,
as we propose, future dangerousness ought to be irrelevant as an aggravating factor
at the selection stage, the irrelevance of lack of future dangerousness as a mitigating
factor follows as night follows day.
Mitigating evidence can also be introduced to prompt the jury to feel sympathy
for, and extend mercy to, the defendant. Current law seems to allow the defendant to
introduce mitigating evidence merely to evoke a merciful response from the jury.333
Yet, just as dangerousness is a different question from enhanced culpability, an ex-
tension of mercy is not necessarily a recognition of reduced culpability.334 A jury
might be merciful to one fully culpable for a grave crime and who therefore deserves
death.335 Indeed, paradoxically, the only offenders capable of being afforded mercy
are those who justice dictates should die; all others can rely on justice and have no
need for mercy.336 Thus, evidence designed to evoke a merciful response "is no more
relevant to a meaningful evaluation of the defendant's culpability than is evidence of
his dangerous character., 337
It may be that the same evidence introduced to demonstrate a defendant's general
good character, predict his lack of future dangerousness, or evoke a merciful response
also demonstrates reduced culpability for the crime in question. Yet guiding the jury
to consider the evidence for the limited purpose of its effect on the culpability of the
338 bdefendant, rather than those other, broader purposes, seems to be a step in the
direction of ameliorating the effects of information overload. In addition, in the run
of cases, the sheer amount of mitigating evidence likely will be reduced if these other
roles are eliminated.
Such a step would also be in line with cases in which the Supreme Court has held
that a state may structure thejury's consideration of mitigating evidence by permitting
it to give effect to mitigating evidence for one purpose but not necessarily for all
purposes.339 For example, in Johnson v. Texas, the Court held that jurors could
constitutionally be instructed to consider the defendant's youth only as it related to the
332 Id. at 233.
333 See id. at 264 n.359 ("Admissible mitigating facts or circumstances have never been
limited to those which reduce the defendant's culpability, but instead extend to any facts or
circumstances that evoke in the sentencer a willingness to be merciful." (citing California v.
Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 562-63 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).
31 Id. at 265 (distinguishing "mercy" from "mitigation").
331 See id. at 264 ("When, based on evidence that elicits sympathy for the defendant or shows
his or her 'good' character, a less severe sentence is imposed on a defendant than others who
commit comparably grave crimes, that sentence is the product of mercy.").
336 See Jeffrie Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMrON,
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 162, 167 (1988) ("If mercy requires a tempering of justice, then
there is a sense in which mercy may require a departure from justice.").
331 Covey, supra note 54, at 250.
338 See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
139 See Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and
Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1147, 1190-96 (1991).
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question of his future dangerousness.' And, more directly on point, in Saffle v.
Parks, the Court held that a jury could be constitutionally instructed not to consider
sympathy for the defendant. 4' In other cases, the Court has impliedly warned against
reading its case law as rendering "constitutionally relevant any and all traits or ex-
periences that distinguish one individual from another."'342 For example, as Steiker
and Steiker note, the Court in one case seemed "distinctly underwhelmed by the sig-
nificance of [the defendant's] receipt of a prize for his dance choreography while in
prison,"343 and has suggested that such trifles as the defendant's impeccable personal
hygiene should fare little better as a mitigating factor." Individual Justices have been
even more blunt.345 Thus, avoiding the problem of information overload in the way
in which we have suggested would not necessarily come at the cost of dramatically
altering current law.
It may also be that capital jurors will inevitably allow merciful tendencies to play
a part in their decision making.' Yet that is a far cry from allowing in evidence
whose only purpose could be to evoke a merciful response or failing to instruct ajury
to consider mitigating evidence only as it bears on the defendant's culpability.
Though mercy might be an inevitable instinct, we need not abet it when to do so
would be unjust.347
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has genuinely attempted to create a capital punishment system
void of arbitrariness. However, because the capital jury must process virtually an
unlimited amount of aggravating and mitigating evidence, current death penalty
340 509 U.S. 350, 369 (1993).
3' 494 U.S. 484, 490 (1990).
342 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 296, at 843.
3 Id. at 844 (discussing Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 382 n.5 (1990)); accord
Jenny E. Carroll, Note, Images of Women and Capital Sentencing Among Female Offenders:
Exploring the Outer Limits of the Eighth Amendment and Articulated Theories of Justice,
75 TEx. L. REv. 1413, 1446 (1997).
34 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 296, at 844 (discussing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476
U.S. 1, 7 n.2 (1986)); accord Carroll, supra note 343, at 1446.
3" See, e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting the relevance of a defendant's background to the extent that the crime was arguably
"attributable to" something in that background); Skipper, 476 U.S. at 12 (Powell, J., concurring
in the judgment) (suggesting that the Lockett principle be limited to mitigating "evidence that
lessens the defendant's culpability for the crime for which he was convicted").
36 See Covey, supra note 54, at 266 ("[W]e probably must permit mercy to play a limited
role-if only because there probably is no other choice--despite the necessary capriciousness
it injects into the process.").
34 See Murphy, supra note 336, at 167-68 ("What business does (a sentencer] have...
ignoring his [own] obligations to justice while he pursues some private, idiosyncratic, and
not publicly accountable virtue of love or compassion?").
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jurisprudence may have ironically created a system plagued by arbitrariness, due in
part to the fact that the capital jury may suffer from information overload. Informa-
tion overload may well cause capital jurors to disengage from the decision-making
process, and thus employ coping techniques such as satisficing and opting out, result-
ing in an arbitrary death or life decision to merely end the decision-making process.
In light of the Court's "death is different" jurisprudence, neither coping strategy is
acceptable within the death penalty scheme. Therefore, in order to reduce the risk that
the capital jury will experience information overload, and thus reduce arbitrariness
in capital punishment decisions, death penalty jurisdictions should restrain the amount
of information presented to the capital jury by eliminating both victim impact evidence
and evidence of future dangerousness, and by using a culpability-centered approach
to the use of both aggravating and mitigating evidence. The Supreme Court, for its
part, should loosen the constraints on the states with respect to the types and amounts
of mitigating evidence a defendant is permitted to introduce, as well as to the ways in
which the jury can give effect to such evidence. Arbitrariness in the administration
of the death penalty is simply unacceptable, but until the Supreme Court and state
legislatures focus on the potential information overload impact on the capital jury,
it is all but inevitable.
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